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PRISONERS OF FATE: THE CHALLENGES OF CREATING 
CHANGE FOR CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS 
AMY B. CYPHERT* 
ABSTRACT 
 Children of incarcerated parents, the invisible victims of mass 
incarceration, suffer tremendous physical, psychological, educa-
tional, and financial burdens—detrimental consequences that can 
continue even long after a parent has been released.  Although 
these children are blameless, policy makers, judges, and prison of-
ficials in charge of visitation policies have largely overlooked 
them.  The United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Man-
ual explicitly instructs judges to ignore children when fashioning 
their parents’ sentences, and judges have largely hewed to this pol-
icy, even in the wake of the 2005 United States v. Booker decision 
that made those Guidelines merely advisory, not mandatory.  Alt-
hough some scholars have suggested amending the Guidelines or 
making other legislative changes that would bring children’s in-
terests forward at the sentencing phase, these suggestions are less 
likely than ever to bear fruit.  In light of the Trump Administra-
tion’s “tough on crime” rhetoric, new Attorney General Jefferson 
Sessions’ “law and order” reputation, and Republican control of 
the House and Senate, policy change that is viewed as “progres-
sive” is highly unlikely.  Therefore, this Article proposes two other 
avenues for change.  First, in a new and unique proposal, this Ar-
ticle suggests federal judges can and should independently order 
the inclusion of Family Impact Statements into a defendant’s 
presentence investigation report via a heretofore largely unused 
“catchall provision” of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  
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Second, this Article makes three modest policy recommendations 
that are aimed at improving the ability of children to visit their 
incarcerated parents.  Visitation has been shown in studies to be a 
powerful tool of mitigation for many of the harms children experi-
ence when their parents are incarcerated, but visitation rates are 
woefully low.  The options for improving circumstances for chil-
dren of incarcerated parents may well be limited, but there are vi-
able options, and there is no time to waste. 
 
 “We agree with the sentencing judge that a child will bear a 
stigma from being born in prison.  But it has been recognized since 
time immemorial that the sins of parents are visited upon their chil-
dren.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
In April of 2016, the Annie E. Casey Foundation released a policy report 
that detailed in bleak terms the devastating impact that parental incarceration 
has on the children who are left behind.2  Too little attention has been paid to 
these children and the effect their parent’s incarceration has on them.  Schol-
ars have termed them “collateral damage”3 and “invisible victims,”4 and 
noted that the high price they pay in terms of their altered trajectories is the 
“hidden cost[] of our criminal justice policies.”5  As the Annie E. Casey 
Foundation report noted, “policy debates about incarceration rarely focus on 
                                                          
 1.  United States v. Pozzy, 902 F.2d 133, 139 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 2.  ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., A SHARED SENTENCE: THE DEVASTATING TOLL OF PARENTAL 
INCARCERATION ON KIDS, FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES 1–7 (2016), http://www.aecf.org/m/re-
sourcedoc/aecf-asharedsentence-2016.pdf. 
 3.  See, e.g., Roy L. Austin Jr. & Karol Mason, Empowering Our Young People, and Stemming 
the Collateral Damage of Incarceration, THE WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (Oct. 8, 
2014, 7:30 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/10/08/empowering-our-young-
people-and-stemming-collateral-damage-incarceration; see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal Jus-
tice and Black Families: The Collateral Damage of Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1005, 1015 (2001) (“One of the most serious collateral harms imposed by massive incarceration is 
the negative impact on children with parents in prison.”).  
 4.  Michal Gilad & Tal Gat, U.S. v. My Mommy: Evaluation of Prison Nurseries as a Solution 
for Children of Incarcerated Women, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 371, 372 (2013) (noting 
“[t]wo-thirds of incarcerated women have minor children, and as many as seventy to ninety percent 
of incarcerated mothers are the sole caregivers for their children” and asking, “Where do all these 
invisible victims of crime go when deprived of their primary or sole caregiver?” (footnote omitted) 
(first citing BARBARA BLOOM, BARBARA OWEN & STEPHANIE COVINGTON, NAT’L INST. OF 
CORR., GENDER RESPONSIVE STRATEGIES: RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR 
WOMEN OFFENDERS 7 (2003); and then citing Jordana Hart, Bill Lets Mothers in Prison Keep Tots: 
Benefits to Parent and Child are Cited,  BOSTON GLOBE, June 26, 1997, at B1)). 
 5.  JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., FAMILIES LEFT BEHIND: THE 
HIDDEN COSTS OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY 1 (2005), http://www.urban.org/sites/de-
fault/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/310882-Families-Left-Behind.PDF. 
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the burden borne by children and families” when a parent is incarcerated.6  
But a burden is indeed borne.  These blameless children, who have done 
nothing wrong, nonetheless will “do the time” with their parents, and will 
likely experience a myriad of negative impacts.  As the quote from the Pozzy 
case illustrates, sentencing judges have largely accepted as a given, reluc-
tantly or not, that these children are to be punished alongside their parents. 
But is there another way?  Is it simply inevitable that, when a parent has 
engaged in criminal behavior, their children must necessarily suffer?  Are 
there any low-cost, politically-feasible ways to mitigate this suffering?  This 
Article endeavors to examine the viability of a variety of proposals that might 
help children of incarcerated parents, and concludes that, although the path 
forward to assisting them is narrow, it does exist. 
Part I lays out in stark detail the extremely difficult situation that chil-
dren of incarcerated parents experience, outlining the real harms they face—
everything from decreases in their physical and psychological health to an 
increased risk for homelessness and educational failures.  These problems 
follow children into adulthood, setting them up for an increased risk of prob-
lems such as drug use, unemployment, and, ultimately, incarceration them-
selves.  In addition, children of incarcerated parents are disproportionately 
black and living in poverty, mirroring larger trends in the administration of 
criminal justice in this country.  Part I will also explore the reasons that some-
thing shown in studies to mitigate so many of those harms—visitation with 
their parents—is so difficult to achieve in practice, despite the fact that visit-
ation also reduces recidivism rates for incarcerated parents.  Although this 
Article focuses chiefly on federal sentencing practices and rules, and there-
fore on children of parents incarcerated in federal prisons, the harms that chil-
dren experience when a parent is incarcerated extend, of course, to state and 
local jails as well. 
These harms, while relatively well documented by researchers, are 
nonetheless noticeably absent from sentencing decisions and the case law 
surrounding incarceration.  To help explain why this is, the Article shifts in 
Part II to a discussion of the federal criminal sentencing process, and how, 
traditionally, children have been left out of the conversation when a parent is 
facing jail time.  Part II gives a brief history of the Sentencing Guidelines, 
including a discussion of Guidelines Section 5H1.6,7 which explicitly in-
structs sentencing judges that the impact of a parent’s incarceration on minor 
children or other family members is generally not to be considered when 
fashioning a sentence.  Part II also discusses the Supreme Court’s 2005 
United States v. Booker8 decision, which, along with the vacillating opinions 
                                                          
 6.  ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 2, at 2. 
 7.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
 8.  543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
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that have come after it, made the Sentencing Guidelines merely advisory, 
thus freeing federal judges from blindly following them when sentencing a 
parent.  However, Booker and its progeny have largely not lived up to their 
revolutionary potential with respect to taking family impact into considera-
tion at sentencing.  District court judges have taken an uneven approach to 
downward departures on the basis of family responsibilities when sentencing 
parents in the wake of the Booker decision, and this Article examines that 
phenomenon and the various reasons for it.  Part II concludes by discussing 
the fact that the Bureau of Prisons, not sentencing judges, decide where fed-
eral inmates are incarcerated, and subsequently, this decision has a massive 
impact on a child’s ability to visit their parent in prison. 
Part III examines proposed legislative and judicial changes that are rel-
atively feasible in terms of cost and would have a major impact on children 
of incarcerated parents, but are nonetheless unlikely to come to fruition under 
the Trump Administration and current Attorney General Sessions. Ulti-
mately, recommendations that would require action on the part of Con-
gress—such as amending the Sentencing Guidelines to clarify that family re-
sponsibilities can be considered in fashioning a sentence or amending Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 to mandate the inclusion of Family Impact 
Statements in presentence investigation reports—are not, at the present, 
likely to occur.  Similarly, it is unlikely action on the part of the Supreme 
Court—such as directing sentencing judges to ignore the portion of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines that disfavors consideration of family responsibilities in 
sentence formation—would occur. 
But the news is not all bleak: the heart of this Article is Part IV, which 
makes two sets of recommendations aimed at addressing the issues facing 
children of incarcerated parents that are likely to succeed, even if on a patch-
work basis.  First, Part IV explores a novel action that individual federal sen-
tencing judges can take—by using a relatively underutilized provision of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 32(d)(2)(G))—to require that a 
presentence investigation report include information about how a parent’s in-
carceration will impact their minor children.  This recommendation is unique 
to this Article; research did not yield evidence of a single instance of a judge 
using this Rule to require a Family Impact Statement.  But a recent opinion 
out of the Eastern District of New York, where that provision was used to 
require an assessment of collateral consequences as part of the sentencing 
report, provides a useful roadmap of how it could be used here.9  Second, Part 
IV outlines three recommendations for improving prison visitation policies: 
(1) making them explicitly welcoming to children; (2) increasing visiting 
hours; and (3) working with nonprofits to help overcome financial obstacles 
to visitation for children of incarcerated parents.  These three policy changes 
                                                          
 9.  United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). 
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are modest, can be implemented with relatively low cost, and are already oc-
curring in certain jurisdictions around the country. 
Children of incarcerated parents have never had an easy lot.  There is 
little reason to believe that there will be significant legislation aimed at im-
proving their experiences anytime in the foreseeable future.  But there are 
things that can be done by concerned judges, compassionate prison officials, 
and even everyday citizens willing to support nonprofit work.  Efforts to help 
protect and foster these invisible victims are timely and essential. 
I.  DEFINING THE ISSUE AND THE STAKES 
As prison populations have ballooned in recent decades (the United 
States now has the world’s highest incarceration rate),10 so too have the rates 
of parental incarceration.  “From 1980 to 2000, the number of kids with a 
father in prison or jail rose by 500 percent.”11  The problem of parental incar-
ceration is a shockingly pervasive issue.  In the state of Kentucky, for exam-
ple, thirteen percent of all children have a parent who was or is incarcerated.12  
A full sixty-three percent of federal prisoners are the parents of minor chil-
dren, and nearly half lived with their children prior to being sent to prison, 
suggesting that many of them were actively involved in their children’s lives 
prior to their incarceration.13  Conservative estimates place the number of 
children who have had a parent in jail or prison at some point in their lives at 
around 5.1 million.14 
As with so many problems that involve incarceration in this country, the 
issue is one that disproportionately impacts communities of color, with black 
children 7.5 times more likely and Hispanic children 2.6 times more likely 
than white children to have a parent in prison.15  The numbers are stark: for 
a black child born in 1990, there is a one in four chance their father was in-
carcerated before the child’s fourteenth birthday, a chance that doubles to one 
in two if the father never completed high school.16 
Incarceration is also a problem that disproportionately impacts children 
living in poverty.  Children of incarcerated parents are more likely than other 
                                                          
 10.  ROY WALMSLEY, KING’S COLL. LONDON INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD 
PRISON POPULATION LIST 1 (8th ed. 2009), http://www.apcca.org/uploads/8th_Edition_2009.pdf.  
The United States now imprisons 756 per every 100,000 people, more than Russia (629 per 
100,000), Rwanda (604 per 100,000) and Cuba (531 per 100,000).  Id.  
 11.  ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 2, at 1. 
 12.  Id.  
 13.  THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACT SHEET: PARENTS IN PRISON 1–2 (2012), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/parents-in-prison/. 
 14.  ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 2, at 2. 
 15.  THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 13, at 1. 
 16.  Angelia Cai, Insuring Children Against Parental Incarceration Risk, 26 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 91, 93 (2014). 
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children to live in low-income communities with poor-quality housing and 
underperforming schools.17  The high rate of incarceration in these neighbor-
hoods promotes a vicious cycle that is hard for communities to climb out of: 
“The sheer number of absent people depletes available workers and provid-
ers, while constraining the entire community’s access to opportunity—in-
cluding individuals who have never been incarcerated.”18 Even when parents 
are released from prison and return to their families and communities, their 
criminal records can severely reduce their ability to find housing and steady 
employment, further destabilizing their children.19  For example, former in-
mates may be barred from employment opportunities by criminal record dis-
closure requirements or from housing by blanket bans or policies.20 
A.  The Impact of Parental Incarceration on Children 
While it is perhaps a very obvious conclusion to draw, it is nonetheless 
an important statement to make: having a parent who is incarcerated can neg-
atively impact all aspects of a child’s wellbeing and development, including 
their emotional, psychological, and educational development and their phys-
ical and financial wellbeing.  The collateral consequences that parental incar-
ceration can impose on children are broad, vast, and nearly universally neg-
ative.  Of course, it is important to acknowledge that not all family separation 
due to incarceration is negative for children.  Where an incarcerated parent 
was abusive, for example, their absence may improve a child’s situation, at 
least temporarily.  “But more typically, the separation due to imprisonment 
has a negative impact on the family.”21 
Although too little attention has been paid to examining the tolls of in-
carceration and parental separation on children of incarcerated parents, the 
research to date confirms what is intuitive: having a parent in prison is a 
hugely destabilizing event in a child’s life.  Researchers have concluded that 
                                                          
 17.  ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 2, at 4 (citing MICHAEL MITCHELL & MICHAEL 
LEACHMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, CHANGING PRIORITIES: STATE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE REFORMS AND INVESTMENTS IN EDUCATION (2014), https://www.cbpp.org/re-
search/changing-priorities-state-criminal-justice-reforms-and-investments-in-education). 
 18.  Id.  
 19.  Id. (noting that a lack of training and work experience combined with low levels of educa-
tional attainment and a requirement of disclosing a criminal record bar many formerly incarcerated 
people from gainful employment, and that even in public housing there sometimes exist blanket 
bans on people with criminal records).  
 20.  See Ofira Schwartz-Soicher et al., The Effect of Paternal Incarceration on Material Hard-
ship, 85 SOC. SERV. REV. 447, 449 (2011) (noting “incarceration both substantially and statistically 
significantly reduces fathers’ financial contributions to their families, destabilizes family relation-
ships, and hinders men’s postincarceration labor-market performance,” and “families of men with 
an incarceration history may face difﬁculties in ﬁnding housing because landlords may be reluctant 
to rent to such families if they ﬁnd out that the fathers have a criminal record”). 
 21.  TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 6. 
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having an incarcerated parent can traumatize a child in the same way that 
abuse and domestic violence do, and with the same lasting negative impact.22  
Unlike those other forms of loss, the impact of parental separation due to 
parental incarceration has been relatively underexplored.23  What we do 
know, however, is startling. 
Children with an incarcerated parent are more likely to face a range of 
health issues, from asthma and obesity24 to depression and anxiety.25  The 
data is especially striking for very young children (“[m]ore than 15 percent 
of children with parents in federal prison . . . are 4 or younger”)26 and for 
children whose mothers are incarcerated.  For these children, we know that 
the disruption of parental attachment27 caused by parental incarceration can 
sharply increase rates of depression and anxiety and severely disrupt a child’s 
educational performance.28  Older children do not escape unscathed and still 
face serious negative impacts when a parent is incarcerated.  For example, 
researchers have concluded that when parents are incarcerated during their 
children’s adolescence, this separation “interrupts key developmental tasks” 
during the time “when parent-child relations strongly influence issues of 
identity.”29 
                                                          
 22.  ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 2, at 3. 
 23.  TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 2 (“[T]here has been little research exploring these conse-
quences of parental incarceration.  The broader phenomenon of parental separation and loss, partic-
ularly in the context of divorce or death, has, by contrast, received substantial research attention.”). 
 24.  The argument is not, of course, that children automatically develop asthma or obesity as a 
result of having an incarcerated parent.  There are, no doubt, issues of correlation as opposed to 
causation with respect to these negative physical impacts of incarceration.  Those ailments tend to 
occur more in children living in poverty, and as has already been discussed, children living in pov-
erty are disproportionately impacted by parental incarceration to begin with, and further, parental 
incarceration almost always results in a worsening of a family’s financial situation.  See, e.g., Cindy 
Dell Clark, Breathing Poorly: Childhood Asthma and Poverty, in CHILD POVERTY IN AMERICA 
TODAY 33, 37 (Barbara A. Arrighi & David J. Maume eds., 2007) (noting that childhood obesity 
and asthma are both “pronounced problem[s] for African American inner-city poor children”). 
 25.  Austin & Mason, supra note 3. 
 26.  ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 2, at 2 (first citing LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M. 
MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN (2008), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pptmc.pdf; then citing CREASIE FINNEY HAIRSTON, ANNIE E. 
CASEY FOUND., FOCUS ON CHILDREN WITH INCARCERATED PARENTS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
RESEARCH LITERATURE (2007), http://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-FocusonChildren-
with_ncarceratedParentsOverviewofLiterature-2007.pdf). 
 27.  For more on parental attachment in young children and the impact of incarceration on it, 
see generally Ross D. Parke & K. Alison Clarke-Stewart, The Effects of Parental Incarceration on 
Children: Perspectives, Promises, and Policies, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED: THE IMPACT OF 
INCARCERATION AND REENTRY ON CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES 189, 202–04 (Jer-
emy Travis & Michelle Waul eds., 2003). 
 28.  ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 2, at 3.  Children of incarcerated mothers are at an 
especially high risk of dropping out of school.  Id.  
 29.  TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 4 (citing RICHARD LERNER, CONCEPTS AND THEORIES OF 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (3d ed. 2002)). 
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Sadly, even if a parent is released from prison, these negative impacts 
are lasting and haunt children of incarcerated parents through their own adult-
hoods.  Parental imprisonment has consistently been found “to be a strong 
risk factor for antisocial behavior, future offending . . . drug abuse, school 
failure, and unemployment.”30  Because these children are statistically more 
likely to grow up and be incarcerated themselves, the problem of parental 
incarceration is a cyclical one that perpetuates “intergenerational patterns of 
criminal behavior.”31 
As if these negative effects were not enough on their own, they are com-
pounded by the social stigma that children of incarcerated parents may expe-
rience, a stigma that is not attached to other forms of family loss or financial 
hardship (such as divorce or the death of a parent).32  At a recent listening 
session hosted by the Federal Interagency Reentry Council’s Subgroup on 
Children of Incarcerated Parents, a young woman “recalled the humiliation 
she felt when being called out of class after her mother was arrested and the 
shame of having teachers and classmates look at her differently.”33  Like 
other negative impacts on children of incarcerated parents, this stigma often 
persists even after the parent has been released from prison and reunified with 
the family.34 
Of course, when a parent is incarcerated, the family also often experi-
ences a financial burden that intensifies the problems listed above.  “When 
fathers are incarcerated, family income can drop by an average of 22 per-
cent.”35  Even those prisoners who are paid for a prison job earn as little as 
                                                          
 30.  Tamar Lerer, Sentencing the Family: Recognizing the Needs of Dependent Children in the 
Administration of the Criminal Justice System, 9 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 24, 31 (2013) (first citing 
Joseph Murray & David P. Farrington, The Effects of Parental Imprisonment on Children, 37 CRIME 
& JUST. 133, 135 (2008); and then citing Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass 
Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1284 (2004)). 
 31.  Nkechi Taifa & Catherine Beane, Integrative Solutions to Interrelated Issues: A Multidis-
ciplinary Look Behind the Cycle of Incarceration, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 283, 289 (2009) (quot-
ing TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 2). 
 32.  Schwartz-Soicher et al., supra note 20, at 449 (“The community’s interpretation of the 
incarceration and any resulting family hardship might stigmatize mothers in ways that other family 
loss does not.  Stigmatization may leave these mothers ostracized at the very time when they need 
both ﬁnancial and emotional support.” (citations omitted) (first citing Kathryn Edin et al., Father-
hood and Incarceration as Potential Turning Points in the Criminal Careers of Unskilled Men, in 
IMPRISONING AMERICA: THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION 46 (Mary Pattillo et al. 
eds., 2004); and then citing Joyce A. Arditti, Families and Incarceration: An Ecological Approach, 
86 FAM. IN SOC’Y 251 (2005))). 
 33.  HHS and DOJ Host Listening Session with Youth Who Have an Incarcerated Parent, 
YOUTH.GOV (2016), http://youth.gov/feature-article/coip-listening-session-2016. 
 34.  Schwartz-Soicher et al., supra note 20, at 449. 
 35.  ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 2, at 3 (first Citing Rucker C. Johnson, Ever Increas-
ing Levels of Parental Incarceration and the Consequences for Children, in DO PRISONS MAKE US 
SAFER? THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE PRISON BOOM 77 (Steven Raphael & Michael Stoll eds., 
2009); and then citing THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S 
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$350.00 per year.36  Indeed, at least one scholar has called for “incarceration 
insurance” for children of incarcerated parents: “an upfront subsidy to the 
child whose parent goes to prison, to be repaid to the state by the incarcerated 
parent on a deferred basis in lieu of child support.”37 
The lost parental income is not the only financial factor, as families also 
have to deal with court-related fines and fees.  Maintaining contact between 
the incarcerated parent and the child, although crucial to help mitigate some 
of the negative impacts of incarceration (as discussed more fully below), is 
also costly.  It can be expensive and time-consuming for children of incar-
cerated parents to visit, especially given that “84% of parents in federal pris-
ons are incarcerated more than 100 miles from their last residence.”38  Even 
phone calls, seemingly simple but also critical,39 can be a financial burden: 
collect phone calls from inmates cost three times as much as collect calls 
placed from a pay phone outside of prison and five times as much as collect 
calls placed from residential phones.40  Given the loss of income and rise in 
costs associated with parental incarceration, it is no wonder that the rise in 
incarceration over the past several decades has been linked with a rise in child 
homelessness, which occurs especially among African American children.41 
Termination of parental rights is also a very real possibility when par-
ents are incarcerated, and it is little wonder that one out of every five children 
entering our child welfare system has an incarcerated parent.42  Each state has 
its own statute authorizing the involuntary termination of parental rights, and 
“[e]ach state handles termination for imprisoned parents differently, ranging 
from states that allow termination based on incarceration for a specified pe-
riod of time to states that conduct a full-scale critique of the parent-child re-
lationship with incarceration as only one consideration.”43 
                                                          
EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC MOBILITY (2010), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploaded-
files/pcs_assets/2010/collateralcosts1pdf.pdf). 
 36.  TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 5. 
 37.  Cai, supra note 16, at 91. 
 38.  THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 13, at 2 (citing CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN (2000), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/iptc.pdf). 
 39.  For more on the importance of phone calls for inmates, see Artika Tyner et al., Phone Calls 
Creating Lifelines for Prisoners and Their Families: A Retrospective Case Study on the Campaign 
for Prison Phone Justice in Minnesota, 20 TRINITY L. REV. 83, 84–85, 89–91 (2015) (noting that 
phone calls are associated with positive outcomes for inmates and are especially important where 
inmates and/or their friends and family have difficulty communicating via writing). 
 40.  Schwartz-Soicher et al., supra note 20, at 449. 
 41.  Christopher Wildeman, Parental Incarceration, Child Homelessness, and the Invisible 
Consequences of Mass Imprisonment, 651 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 74, 75 (2014). 
 42.  Austin & Mason, supra note 3 (noting “[n]early 20% of all children entering the child 
welfare system have an incarcerated parent”). 
 43.  Steven Fleischer, Termination of Parental Rights: An Additional Sentence for Incarcerated 
Parents, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 312, 312 (1998) (footnote omitted) (first citing COLO. REV. STAT. 
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On the federal level, the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 
(“ASFA”)44 is structured to move children from foster care to adoption place-
ments quickly by requiring states begin the process of terminating parental 
rights any time a child has been in foster care for fifteen out of the past 
twenty-two months.45  These timeframes are especially relevant for incarcer-
ated parents, as “the typical sentence for an incarcerated parent is between 80 
and 100 months.”46  One scholar notes that in practical application, the result 
of ASFA for children of incarcerated parents is that the law “fails to recog-
nize incarcerated parents as deserving of the same protections as non-incar-
cerated parents,” and that such an outcome is triggered in part because incar-
cerated parents are more likely to be poor or members of racial minority 
groups.47  The child welfare system disproportionately impacts children of 
color, and there is evidence that “racism continues to permeate” the child 
welfare system; some scholars have called that system “eerily reminiscent of 
the slave codes and Reconstruction, when African-American families had lit-
tle control over their own composition.”48  Termination of parental rights is, 
in many states, a permanent action and, therefore, not remediable even when 
a parent is released from prison.49 
B.  Visitation as Mitigating Factor 
Despite these bleak outcomes and statistics, there is a ray of hope for 
children of incarcerated parents and the parents themselves, as we know that 
visitation is a relatively easy way to mitigate many of the negative outcomes 
associated with parental incarceration. 
                                                          
ANN. § 19-3-604 (West 1990 & Supp. 1997); and then citing In Re L.A.S., 134 N.J. 127, 631 A.2d 
928 (1993)). 
 44.  Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 103, 111 Stat. 2118-20 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)). 
 45.  Caitlin Mitchell, Family Integrity and Incarcerated Parents: Bridging the Divide, 24 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM 175, 176 (2012). 
 46.  Id. (first citing STEVE CHRISTIAN, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS (2009), https://www.ncsl.org/documents/cyf/childrenofin-
carceratedparents.pdf; and then citing Kathleen S. Bean, Reasonable Efforts. What State Courts 
Think, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 321, 348–51 (2005)). 
 47.  Id. at 178–79. 
 48.  Shani King, The Family Law Canon in a (Post?) Racial Era, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 575, 609–
10, 614 (2011) (citing Ralph Ricard Banks, Beyond Colorblindness: Neo-Racialism and the Future 
of Race and Law Scholarship, 25 HARV. BLACK LETTER L.J. 41, 42 (2009)).  
 49.  Mitchell, supra note 45, at 178. 
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1.  Benefits of Visitation 
Numerous studies have concluded that frequent and high quality visits 
between incarcerated parents and their children are beneficial for both.50  In-
deed, one of the two major determinants of child adjustment during the period 
of parental incarceration is the child’s opportunities to maintain contact with 
the incarcerated parent (the other is the nature and quality of the alternative 
caregiving arrangements).51  Although some scholars caution against declar-
ing such visits universally beneficial, noting that much of the research on 
prison visitation has focused on the benefit to the incarcerated parent and less 
on benefits to their children,52 even these scholars accept visitation as neutral 
at worst for children, noting that “[n]o studies have shown that visitation in 
prison destroys the benefits [typically associated with] parent/child visita-
tion.”53  The majority of those who have studied the issue have concluded 
that where the visitation is of a high quality, it is associated with positive 
outcomes for children, and that “maintaining contact with one’s incarcerated 
parent appears to be one of the most effective ways to improve a child’s emo-
tional response to the incarceration and reduce the incidence of problematic 
behavior.”54 
Visits have also been shown to reduce recidivism rates amongst incar-
cerated parents and improve long-term success upon reentry.55  One relatively 
                                                          
 50.  See generally Chesa Boudin et al., Prison Visitation Policies: A Fifty-State Survey, 32 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 151‒52 (2013) (providing a summary of visitation policies in federal 
prisons and in the fifty states). 
 51.  Ross D. Parke & K. Alison Clarke-Stewart, Effects of Parental Incarceration on Young 
Children, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES (Dec. 1, 2001), https://aspe.hhs.gov/basic-
report/effects-parental-incarceration-young-children.  This paper was presented at the National Pol-
icy Conference, “From Prison to Home: The Effect of Incarceration and Reentry on Children, Fam-
ilies and Communities,” in Washington, D.C. 
 52.  See, e.g., Benjamin Guthrie Stewart, Comment, When Should a Court Order Visitation 
Between a Child and an Incarcerated Parent?, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 165, 171–75 (2002) 
(noting that despite the lack of research into the impact of children visiting their parents in prison, 
most experts conclude such visits are beneficial); see also Rebecca J. Shlafer et al., Introduction 
and Literature Review: Is Parent-Child Contact During Parental Incarceration Beneficial?, in 
CHILDREN’S CONTACT WITH INCARCERATED PARENTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND 
INTERVENTION 1, 16 (Julie Poehlmann-Tynan ed., 2015) (describing one researcher as concluding: 
“[T]he effects of parent-child contact could not be globally described as good or bad.  Rather . . . 
such effects depend on variations in the quality of visitation experiences.”). 
 53.  Stewart, supra note 52, at 175. 
 54.  NANCY G. LA VIGNE ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., BROKEN BONDS: 
UNDERSTANDING AND ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF CHILDREN WITH INCARCERATED PARENTS 10 
(2008), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/411616-Broken-Bonds-
Understanding-and-Addressing-the-Needs-of-Children-with-Incarcerated-Parents.PDF. 
 55.  Id. at 10–11; see also William D. Bales & Daniel P. Mears, Inmate Social Ties and the 
Transition to Society: Does Visitation Reduce Recidivism?, 45 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 287, 
304 (2008); TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 6 (“Studies comparing the outcomes of prisoners who 
maintained family connections during prison through letters and personal visits with those who did 
not suggest that maintaining family ties reduces recidivism rates.”). 
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recent and large-scale study reviewed the impact of visitation on rates of re-
cidivism among 16,420 offenders released from Minnesota prisons between 
2003 and 2007.56  The researchers found that any visit at all reduced the risk 
of recidivism by thirteen percent for felony reconvictions and by twenty-five 
percent for technical violation revocations.57  Further, more frequent visits 
and visits that were timed near the date of the inmate’s release were associ-
ated with even greater reductions in recidivism.58  That study also noted that 
recent research in Florida and Canada has produced similar results, finding 
that visitation is associated with reduced recidivism.59  Because recidivism is 
costly to society in multiple ways (in Minnesota, for example, release viola-
tors cost the state an average of $9,000 for every return to prison),60 this re-
search suggests that visitation would be a good area of investment for prisons, 
a point that is relevant to this Article’s recommendations aimed at improving 
prison visitation policies. 
2.  Barriers to Visitation 
Despite these wide-ranging and fairly well-established benefits, fewer 
than half of all incarcerated parents are ever visited by their minor children, 
and even amongst those who do receive visits, many describe them as “infre-
quent.”61  While every family and situation is different, the three main barri-
ers to visitation identified by researchers are: (1) financial costs, a hurdle ex-
acerbated, as discussed above, by the fact that these children are more likely 
to live in poverty; (2) fear of psychological harm/stigma to children during 
visitation; and (3) visitation policies that generally do not consider children’s 
unique needs and are sometimes actively hostile to them. 
The cost of visitation, from bus fares or gas costs to meals and missed 
work for adults, can certainly chill visits from children to their incarcerated 
parents.  As noted above, children of incarcerated parents often come from 
                                                          
 56.  Grant Duwe & Valerie Clark, Blessed Be the Social Tie That Binds: The Effects of Prison 
Visitation on Offender Recidivism, 24 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 271, 271 (2013). 
 57.  Id. at 289. 
 58.  Id.  Interestingly, the researchers found “not all types of visitation ha[d] a beneficial effect 
on recidivism”; visits from ex-spouses, for example, were associated with an increase in recidivism.  
Id. at 290.  The researchers theorized that those visits may have had more of an impact on recidivism 
than other visits in part because, for married inmates, “visits with either spouses or children may be 
difficult because they create more stress and are often reminders of how their incarceration is pre-
venting them from raising their children or helping provide for their families.”  Id.  Visits from 
fathers, siblings, clergy, and in-laws were the most important for reducing recidivism.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 276–77. 
 60.  Id. at 291. 
 61.  Keva M. Miller, The Impact of Parental Incarceration on Children: An Emerging Need for 
Effective Interventions, 23 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 472, 476 (2006) (citing Cynthia 
Seymour, Children with Parents in Prison: Child Welfare Policy, Program, and Practice Issues, 77 
CHILD WELFARE 460 (1998)); THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 13, at 2. 
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low-income communities, and a vast majority of parents in federal prisons 
are incarcerated more than 100 miles from their last residence.62  Thus, such 
a visit can take a day or longer.  The ability to bear these costs is of course 
exacerbated by the financial strain that parental imprisonment places on fam-
ilies.  Even technological advances such as video visitation may not fully 
address the financial barriers to visitation, given that this technology is often 
prohibitively expensive.  Some jurisdictions charge $20.00 for a twenty mi-
nute “visit,” for example.63  As one scholar notes, “the fees for online video 
visitation run the risk of becoming exploitative” because the unregulated fees 
are not tied to the costs of the service but rather are a way for prisons to make 
money off of the desire of families to stay in touch with their incarcerated 
loved ones.64 
Further, incarcerated parents may be reluctant to have their children see 
them in prison, and/or the children’s caregivers may worry about the psycho-
logical harm of such a visit.65  This fear has even been enshrined in Supreme 
Court precedent: “children [who visit inmates in prison] are at risk of seeing 
or hearing harmful conduct during visits and must be supervised with special 
care in prison visitation facilities.”66  Yet, the Federal Interagency Reentry 
Council recently touted its efforts to improve access to video communication 
for incarcerated parents because “this technology may give a way for children 
to interact with their incarcerated parents without experiencing the stigma 
and difficulties of visiting a parent in a correctional facility.”67  As for par-
ents, one group of researchers noted that visits with their children may be a 
stark reminder that the incarcerated parent is not able to be fully present for 
their child in a traditional way, or to provide for that child.68  Accordingly, 
an incarcerated parent may choose to self-restrict visitation with his or her 
child in an attempt to shield both of them from pain. 
Finally, as will be discussed more fully below, prison visitation policies 
also complicate the ability of incarcerated parents to maintain relationships 
with their children.  Inconvenient visitation hours, lack of parking, visitation 
rooms that are not private or child friendly, and rules about who is eligible to 
                                                          
 62.  THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 13, at 2. 
 63.  Patrice A. Fulcher, The Double Edged Sword of Prison Video Visitation: Claiming to Keep 
Families Together While Furthering the Aims of the Prison Industrial Complex, 9 FLA. A&M U. L. 
REV. 83, 97 (2013).  Professor Fulcher also notes that there is reason to be skeptical of video visit-
ation in general, arguing that “caution should be exercised where cost saving measures may lead to 
human exploitation.”  Id. at 87–88. 
 64.  Id. at 108. 
 65.  Miller, supra note 61, at 476. 
 66.  Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 129 (2003). 
 67.  THE FED. INTERAGENCY REENTRY COUNCIL, A RECORD OF PROGRESS AND A ROADMAP 
FOR THE FUTURE 60 (2016), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/FIRC-
Reentry-Report.pdf. 
 68.  Duwe & Clark, supra note 56, at 290. 
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visit and when visitation can occur, can all deter family members, especially 
children, from visiting.69  Ultimately, while visitation is one of the most im-
portant protective measures for a child of incarcerated parents, it is highly 
underutilized. 
II.  UNITED STATES V. BOOKER: AN INADEQUATE REVOLUTION 
Several scholars have argued that one way to combat the very real prob-
lems wrought by parental incarceration is through reform of sentencing prac-
tices and policies.70  Many have seized upon the Supreme Court’s 2005 
United States v. Booker decision and the resulting revolution in sentencing to 
argue that such sentencing reform is timely.71  Sentencing reform, and the 
associated goal of rethinking the criminal justice system that arrests, prose-
cutes, and incarcerates so many people to begin with is certainly essential.  
However, as this Part demonstrates, sentencing reform is an unlikely vehicle 
for improving the experiences of children of incarcerated parents, both be-
cause Booker has had a relatively small impact on district court judges’ sen-
tencing practices with respect to their consideration of defendants’ family ties 
and also because of mixed messages from appellate courts.  This Part will 
address the advent of the federal sentencing guidelines, the policy decision 
to codify within them a disregard for parental status, and what Booker and 
subsequent cases have meant in practical terms for the consideration at sen-
tencing of defendants’ family responsibilities. 
A.  The Advent of the Sentencing Guidelines 
In the mid-1980s, sentencing within the federal court system was wildly 
inconsistent, and similarly situated defendants charged with comparable 
crimes could and did receive vastly different sentences.72  The disparities 
                                                          
 69.  Parke & Clarke-Stewart, supra note 51. 
 70.  See, e.g., Emily W. Andersen, “Not Ordinarily Relevant”: Bringing Family Responsibili-
ties to the Federal Sentencing Table, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1501, 1501 (2015) (arguing “the Guidelines 
should be amended to indicate that courts can consider family ties and responsibilities when deter-
mining a sentence,” and that “Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should be 
amended to require that a family impact assessment be incorporated into each presentence investi-
gation report to provide courts with information about a defendant’s family ties and responsibili-
ties”). 
 71.  See, e.g., Sarah Abramowicz, A Family Law Perspective on Parental Incarceration, 50 
FAM. CT. REV. 228, 228 (2012) (arguing “[s]entencing law is in flux, making this an opportune time 
to reconsider whether and to what extent we should take children’s interests into account when 
sentencing their parents”). 
 72.  See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364–65 (1989). 
Congress delegated almost unfettered discretion to the sentencing judge to determine 
what the sentence should be within the customarily wide range so selected.  This broad 
discretion was further enhanced by the power later granted the judge to suspend the sen-
tence and by the resulting growth of an elaborate probation system.  Also, with the advent 
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were further aggravated by the fact that parole boards could unilaterally re-
lease a prisoner early for good behavior.73  Spurred on by public outcry over 
this inconsistent sentencing, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984 provisions of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,74 which 
provided for the creation of a United States Sentencing Commission (“the 
Sentencing Commission”) and the promulgation of guidelines for federal 
judges (“the Guidelines”) to follow when sentencing defendants.75 
The first set of Sentencing Guidelines, which became effective on No-
vember 1, 1987, essentially abolished parole and established a series of sen-
tencing ranges that took into account (1) the seriousness of the criminal con-
duct (referred to as “offense behavior”) and (2) the defendant’s criminal 
record (part of the category of “offender characteristics”).76  The Guidelines 
were mandatory and federal judges could only “depart” from them (sentenc-
ing a defendant to a longer or shorter sentence than that contemplated by the 
Guidelines range) if he or she determined that “an aggravating or mitigating 
circumstance exist[ed] that was not adequately taken into consideration by 
the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines.”77 
Crucially, Section 5H1.6 of the Guidelines provided that “[f]amily ties 
and responsibilities . . . are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a 
sentence should be outside the guidelines.”78  In adopting Section 5H1.6, the 
                                                          
of parole, Congress moved toward a ‘three-way sharing’ of sentencing responsibility by 
granting corrections personnel in the Executive Branch the discretion to release a prisoner 
before the expiration of the sentence imposed by the judge.  Thus, under the indetermi-
nate-sentence system, Congress defined the maximum, the judge imposed a sentence 
within the statutory range (which he usually could replace with probation), and the Ex-
ecutive Branch’s parole official eventually determined the actual duration of imprison-
ment. 
Id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) (“Congress sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing 
the wide disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offend-
ers.”). 
 73.  See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364–65 (describing Executive Branch power to release prisoners 
early). 
 74.  Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3551  (2012)). 
 75.  18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2012). 
 76.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1987). 
The statute contains many detailed instructions as to how this determination should be 
made, but the most important of them instructs the Commission to create categories of 
offense behavior and offender characteristics.  An offense behavior category might con-
sist, for example, of ‘bank robbery/committed with a gun/$2500 taken.’ An offender 
characteristic category might be ‘offender with one prior conviction who was not sen-
tenced to imprisonment.’ 
Id. 
 77.  Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1990 (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2012)); see also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367–68 (discussing the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984). 
 78.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1987). 
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Sentencing Commission was responding to a congressional mandate speci-
fying that it is generally inappropriate for judges to consider family ties and 
responsibilities in fashioning an appropriate sentence.79  According to the 
legislative history, this Section was adopted in an attempt to address concern 
that those with strong community and family ties would otherwise be given 
sentences that were too lenient.80  As a former member of the Sentencing 
Commission wrote, in an attempt to reduce the sentencing disparities be-
tween “white, middle class defendants with strong ties to visibly intact fam-
ilies” and “unemployed, unmarried minority defendants,” Congress decided 
the fair solution was to largely ignore family responsibilities in calculating 
the Guidelines’ ranges.81 
Accordingly, once the Guidelines were in place, federal district court 
judges were instructed to depart downward on the basis of a “discouraged 
factor . . .only if the factor [was] present to an exceptional degree or in some 
other way ma[de] the case different from the ordinary case.”82  Appellate 
courts generally held that family ties were only “exceptional” when the de-
fendant was an “irreplaceable” caretaker of children or other elderly or ill 
family members.83 
B.  United States v. Booker and Its Impact (or Lack Thereof) 
The Guidelines, and their de-emphasis of parental responsibilities in 
fashioning sentences of incarceration, were binding on federal judges from 
their introduction in 1987 until 2005, when the Supreme Court in a landmark 
decision declared that the Sixth Amendment requires that the Guidelines be 
merely advisory.84  In United States v. Booker, the Court held that because 
the Guidelines were mandatory and binding, and because departures were not 
available “[i]n most cases, as a matter of law,”  juries were precluded from 
                                                          
 79.  28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (2012). 
 80.  Ilene H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, The Role of Gender in a Structured Sentencing System: 
Equal Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing of Female Offenders Under the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 181, 201 (1994). 
 81.  Id.  
 82.  Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996). 
 83.  United States v. Leon, 341 F.3d 928, 929, 931 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming the downward 
departure for a husband whose wife was ill with cancer and potentially suicidal, where the husband 
was the sole source of financial support for the wife and all other family members were deceased or 
otherwise unavailable); see also United States v. Pereira, 272 F.3d 76, 81–83 (1st Cir. 2001) (re-
versing the downward departure for a son who provided approximately twenty hours of care per 
week to his elderly parents, noting the presence of alternative sources of care such as other siblings 
and nursing homes); United States v. Faria, 161 F.3d 761, 762–63 (2d Cir. 1998) (vacating the 
downward departure for a father whose three minor children lived with his ex-wife and had alter-
native sources of financial support). 
 84.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
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fulfilling their constitutional duty of determining the facts that led to sentenc-
ing, denying defendants their Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.85  The 
Court did not get rid of the Guidelines entirely, but merely made them advi-
sory rather than binding on judges.86  The Court also invalidated Sec-
tion 3742(e) of the Guidelines, which had required appellate courts to apply 
a de novo standard of review to district court departures from the Guidelines, 
and made clear that appellate courts should review them only for “reasona-
bleness.”87 
Following Booker, the Supreme Court issued a series of decisions that 
seemed to swing back and forth between reinforcing judicial discretion and 
reinforcing adherence to the Guidelines.  If Booker opened the door to district 
court judges exercising more discretion in sentencing decisions, the Court’s 
next decision disincentivized them from doing so.  In Rita v. United States,88 
the Supreme Court gave permission to appellate courts to presume that a sen-
tence within the Guidelines range was a reasonable sentence.89  As Justice 
Souter noted in his dissent, the presumption creates a powerful temptation 
for trial judges (who are understandably not eager to be overturned) to sen-
tence defendants within the Guidelines range.90 
The Court did not stay on the side of Guidelines adherence for long, 
though; later that same year, the Court bolstered the ability of district court 
judges to exercise discretion.  In Gall v. United States,91 the Court clarified 
that the rather deferential “abuse-of-discretion” standard was the proper one 
for appellate review of the “reasonableness” of district court sentencing de-
cisions.92  In so doing, the Court rejected a rule adopted by several courts of 
appeals that required district courts to give “‘proportional’ justifications for 
departures from the Guidelines range.”93  Once again, district courts were 
given the message that the Guidelines were truly advisory. 
The Court seemingly reinforced judicial discretion with its Kimbrough 
v. United States94 decision, holding that a sentencing court could outright re-
ject the Guidelines’ policies in fashioning a sentence.95  In that case, the dis-
trict court had departed downward, in part out of disagreement with the then-
                                                          
 85.  Id. at 233–37. 
 86.  Id. at 258–60. 
 87.  Id. at 260–63. 
 88.  551 U.S. 338 (2007). 
 89.  Id. at 341. 
 90.  Id. at 391–92 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 91.  552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
 92.  Id. at 41. 
 93.  Id. at 46. 
 94.  552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
 95.  Id. at 91. 
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existing Sentencing Guidelines’ 100-to-1 ratio for crack cocaine versus pow-
der cocaine sentences.96  The sentencing disparity was deeply unpopular; 
even as the Court was hearing Kimbrough, the Sentencing Commission itself 
had already reversed course on the sentencing disparity between crack and 
powder cocaine, and Congress ultimately addressed the disparity through leg-
islative means.97  Because Kimbrough limits the times when a judge can re-
ject the Guidelines’ policies and suggests closer appellate review may be ap-
propriate when courts do so, at least one commentator has suggested that 
Kimbrough, “[d]espite [its] pro-discretion holding[], . . . contain[s] language 
that encourages fealty to the Guidelines.”98 
The Court did ultimately extend to district court judges the ability to 
depart from the Guidelines for policy disagreements outside of crack cocaine 
guidelines.  In Pepper v. United States,99 the Court affirmed a district court’s 
downward departure based on post-sentencing rehabilitation, despite the ex-
istence of a federal statute100 and a Commission policy statement101 disfavor-
ing consideration of such evidence at sentencing.102  However, like Kim-
brough, the Pepper decision is mixed on the question of judicial discretion 
and Guidelines allegiance: the Court was careful to limit its holding to those 
cases where judicial deviation from the Guidelines on the basis of policy dis-
agreements is “appropriate,” without fully defining that term.103 
Whatever the intended impact of Booker and subsequent cases on the 
balance between sentencing judges’ discretion and Guidelines fealty, many 
federal judges in the years since have hewed rather tightly to the Guidelines, 
                                                          
 96.  Id. at 91–93 (explaining that under Guidelines Section 2D1.1, “a drug trafficker dealing in 
crack cocaine is subject to the same sentence as one dealing in 100 times more powder cocaine”). 
 97.  Carissa Byrne Hessick, A Critical View of the Sentencing Commission’s Recent Recom-
mendations to “Strengthen the Guidelines System”, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1335, 1340 (2014). 
 98.  Id. at 1339–40. 
 99.  562 U.S. 476 (2011). 
 100.  18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)(2) (2012) precluded a district court from “impos[ing] a sentence out-
side the applicable guidelines range except upon a ground that was specifically and affirmatively” 
relied upon in the prior sentencing and upheld as a valid ground on appeal, and therefore prohibited 
a district court from departing on the basis of anything post-sentence.  Section 3742(g)(2) was held 
unconstitutional by the Pepper decision.  562 U.S. at 496. 
 101.  Section 5K2.19 provided that “[p]ost-sentencing rehabilitative efforts, even if exceptional, 
undertaken by a defendant after imposition of a term of imprisonment for the instant offense are not 
an appropriate basis for a downward departure when resentencing the defendant for that offense.” 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.19 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2011) (withdrawn 
2012).   
 102.  Pepper, 562 U.S. at 481. 
 103.  Id. at 501 (“[O]ur post-Booker decisions make clear that a district court may in appropriate 
cases impose a non-Guidelines sentence based on a disagreement with the Commission’s views.  
That is particularly true where, as here, the Commission’s views rest on wholly unconvincing policy 
rationales not reflected in the sentencing statutes Congress enacted.” (citation omitted) (citing Kim-
brough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109–10 (2007))). 
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with compliance104 stabilizing at above eighty percent.105  Various theories 
for this phenomenon have been suggested, including fear of non-Guidelines 
sentences being overturned106 (as predicted by Justice Souter in his dissent in 
Rita),107 sentencing judges’ comfort and familiarity with the Guidelines,108 
and judicial desire to avoid disparate sentences109 (which, sadly, appears to 
be well founded, as the Sentencing Commission itself has reported a widen-
ing gap in racial disparities between white and black defendants post-
Booker).110  Despite repeated rulings from the Supreme Court encouraging 
judicial discretion in sentencing,111 as one scholar has noted, “[t]he gravita-
tional pull of the Guidelines appears to be so strong that the change from 
mandatory to advisory Guidelines has had little to no impact on the average 
                                                          
 104.  Compliance is defined as defendants who are sentenced within the applicable advisory 
Guidelines range or pursuant to a request from the government for a sentence below the otherwise 
applicable advisory Guidelines range. 
 105.  Uncertain Justice: The Status of Federal Sentencing and the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
Six Years After U.S. v. Booker: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland 
Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) (statement of Judge Patti B. Saris, 
Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-
testimony-and-reports/testimony/20111012_Saris_Testimony.pdf.  But see Ryan W. Scott, Inter-
Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4–5, 33 (2010) (con-
cluding that five years of data from the District of Massachusetts suggest that judges there did re-
spond to increased discretion in sentencing post-Booker, though acknowledging that the results are 
“necessarily tentative” and limited to one single district court). 
 106.  Nancy Gertner, Judicial Discretion in Federal Sentencing—Real or Imagined?, 28 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 165, 165 (2016) (“[I]n jurisdictions with crowded dockets, or where that is the percep-
tion, in jurisdictions that suffered from rigorous Guideline enforcement before Booker, the Guide-
lines are the easy default. . . .  [Judges who follow the Guidelines] will appear efficient and . . . will 
surely avoid criticism.”).  
 107.  Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 391–92 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 108.  Mark Osler & Judge Mark W. Bennett, A “Holocaust in Slow Motion?” America’s Mass 
Incarceration and the Role of Discretion, 7 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 117, 155 (2014). 
 109.  Frank O. Bowman, III, Dead Law Walking: The Surprising Tenacity of the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1227, 1269 (2014). 
[The Guidelines] give[] guidance in the one area in which judges are most likely to feel 
in need of it.  How, after all, does one go about quantifying punishment for crime?  Judges 
faced with the task are acutely aware of the inevitable subjectivity of the exercise and are 
customarily grateful for standards provided by officially anointed experts, even if they 
may not always agree with the experts in particular cases. 
Id. (citing Federal Sentencing After Booker: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Comm’n (2012) (state-
ment of Judge Paul J. Barbadoro, Judicial Confererce of the U.S. Comm. on Criminal Law), 
https://www.ussc.gov/research/congressional-reports/2012-report-congress-continuing-impact-
united-states-v-booker-federal-sentencing 
 110.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, [PART E: DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN SENTENCING] 
REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 1 
(2012), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-re-
ports/booker-reports/2012-booker/Part_E.pdf. 
 111.  Admittedly, federal district court judges could be forgiven for seeing seemingly pro-dis-
cretion decisions such as Gall as somewhat murky.  See, e.g., Hessick, supra note 97, at 1337–40. 
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length of federal sentences.”112  For many federal defendants and for others 
involved in the federal criminal system, Booker has had a very small impact 
indeed.113 
C.  Post-Booker Section 5H1.6 Decisions 
Given the mixed signals sent by the Supreme Court regarding Guide-
lines allegiance versus judicial discretion, it is perhaps no surprise that courts 
post-Booker have not responded uniformly to their enhanced leeway to con-
sider family ties in sentencing decisions.  Rather, “[i]nterpretive disparity re-
garding when and how to apply family ties departures persists.”114  Some 
courts have looked to United States Code Section 3553(a)(1),115 which in-
structs sentencing judges to consider “the history and characteristics of the 
defendant” in determining the appropriate sentence, and have concluded that 
this language permits consideration of a defendant’s family ties and respon-
sibilities, Section 5H1.6 notwithstanding.  For example, the Ninth Circuit has 
held that “[i]n the ‘broader appraisal,’ available to district courts after 
Booker, courts can justify consideration of family responsibilities, an aspect 
of the defendant’s ‘history and characteristics,’ for reasons extending beyond 
the Guidelines.”116  Indeed, Justice Stevens appeared to bless this approach 
in his concurrence in the Rita decision, noting that while matters such as fam-
ily ties are not ordinarily considered under the Guidelines, it is nonetheless a 
“matter[] that § 3553(a) authorizes the sentencing judge to consider.”117  The 
First Circuit has noted that Booker and Kimbrough opened the door for a 
judge to “vary from the [Guidelines], disagreeing with details or even major 
premises” when determining whether family responsibilities are the proper 
                                                          
 112.  Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and “Blind Spot” Biases in 
Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 489, 521 (2014). 
 113.  Bowman, supra note 109, at 1229–30 (“[F]rom the points of view of federal defendants in 
the mass and of the system that processes them from arrest to prison gate, perhaps the most surpris-
ing fact about Booker is just how small an effect it has actually had.”) 
 114.  Andersen, supra note 70, at 1524.  
 115.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2012). 
 116.  United States v. Menyweather, 447 F.3d 625, 628, 634 (9th Cir. 2006), overruled on other 
grounds by Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) 
(first citing United States v. Gorsuch, 404 F.3d 543, 548 (1st Cir. 2005); and then citing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(1) (2012)) (affirming downward departure for defendant mother who was a single parent, 
whose fiancé had been murdered while she was pregnant with their child, and was the sole source 
of financial support for a minor child). 
 117.  Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 364–65 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also 
United States v. Serrata, 425 F.3d 886, 918–19 (10th Cir. 2005) (characterizing family ties as rele-
vant under the post-Booker § 3553(a)(1) analysis); United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 
986 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (same). 
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basis for a downward departure.118  The Second Circuit has held that Section 
5H1.6 is “no more binding on sentencing judges than the calculated Guide-
lines ranges themselves.”119 
Other courts, however, have continued to place substantial weight in 
Section 5H1.6.  In United States v. Christman,120 the Sixth Circuit overturned 
a below-Guidelines sentence for a defendant that had been based, in part, on 
his family ties, specifically caring for his elderly mother.121  The court noted 
that under Section 5H1.6, a defendant’s family ties were not ordinarily rele-
vant and should only be considered by district courts “in exceptional 
cases.”122  The court, acknowledging the existence of Booker but nonetheless 
citing to pre-Booker commentary on Section 5H1.6, concluded that the de-
fendant’s care of his mother was simply not irreplaceable.123  The court rea-
soned that alternative arrangements could generally be made for the care of 
children, including foster care, and thus parenthood itself was not a reason to 
depart downward.  “To say otherwise would be to invite gross sentencing 
disparities based solely on whether one has a young child . . . .”124 
Other courts have similarly clung to the notion that only “irreplaceable” 
caregivers should be granted downward departures, even in a post-Booker 
world.  In United States v. Lackard,125 the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district 
court’s refusal to grant a defendant downward departure to allow him to care 
for his son with disabilities because he was not “irreplaceable” as a care-
giver.126  Although the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that this “irreplaceable 
caregiver” standard was the one in use prior to the Booker decision, it none-
theless reasoned that “the Guidelines are still to be considered in determining 
an appropriate sentence,” and ultimately affirmed the district court deci-
sion.127 
                                                          
 118.  United States v. Prosperi, 686 F.3d 32, 48–49 (1st Cir. 2012) (affirming the downward 
departure for a defendant who cared for his wife, who was battling cancer, and a defendant who 
provided care for daughter with disabilities).  
 119.  United States v. Thavaraja, 740 F.3d 253, 255, 262–63 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting United 
States v. Jones, 460 F.3d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 2006)) (affirming the below-Guidelines sentence for a 
defendant based in part on the impact his deportation would have on his family). 
 120.  607 F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 121.  Id. at 1112. 
 122.  Id. at 1119 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. H, introductory 
cmt. (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1995)). 
 123.  Id. at 1120. 
 124.  Id.  
 125.  549 F. App’x 193 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 126.  Id. at 195–96 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. H, introductory 
cmt. (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2012)). 
 127.  Id. at 196 (holding that the defendant had “failed to rebut the presumption of reasonable-
ness afforded his within-Guidelines sentence”). 
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Courts trying to sort out the contours of Booker and its progeny have 
not even been able to reach a consensus in their treatment of pregnant de-
fendants at sentencing.128  In 2012, a district court in Kentucky affirmed a 
magistrate judge’s decision to depart downward and sentence a defendant to 
two years of probation, in part because the defendant was two months preg-
nant.129  Although the district court judge noted that “[t]he explicit references 
to [the defendant’s] pregnancy” by the magistrate judge at sentencing gave 
him pause, and that he “would have opted for a different, stiffer penalty,”130 
he nonetheless affirmed the probation sentence, noting that a court imposing 
punishment could properly consider a defendant’s family ties and responsi-
bilities.131  By contrast, the very next year, a district court in Pennsylvania 
denied a motion to vacate a sentence that did not grant a departure for the 
defendant’s pregnancy.132  In its opinion, the court noted federal courts’ re-
luctance to grant downward departures where female defendants became 
pregnant subsequent to their arrests or convictions, in part because to do so 
is to “send[] an obvious message to all female defendants that pregnancy is 
‘a way out.’”133  The Court cited to Section 5H1.6, noting that “[p]regnancy 
of a female defendant is neither unusual nor extraordinary and is something 
that the Bureau of Prisons ‘has had experience in handling.’”134 
Ultimately, although family ties are now the third most common reason 
for a departure from the Guidelines, family-based departures are still granted 
in fewer than ten percent of all cases,135 and courts approach this unevenly 
with most judges continuing to faithfully follow the Guidelines.136  Thus, 
Section 5H1.6 and its disregard for family ties remain important considera-
tions for many federal judges when fashioning an appropriate sentence.  Fur-
ther, the Sentencing Commission has provided no additional guidance to 
judges, nor have they revised Section 5H1.6 since the Booker decision.137  
                                                          
 128.  See Andersen, supra note 70, at 1524–26. 
 129.  United States v. Chamness, No. 5:11-CR-00054-R, 2012 WL 3109494, at *6–7 (W.D. Ky. 
July 31, 2012). 
 130.  Id. at *7. 
 131.  Id. at *6. 
 132.  United States v. McMahill, No. 06-216, 2013 WL 2186981, at *1 (W.D. Pa. May 21, 2013). 
 133.  Id. at *3 (quoting United States v. Pozzy, 902 F.2d 133, 139 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
 134.  Id. at *4 (quoting Pozzy, 902 F.2d at 138–39). 
 135.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, TABLE 25: REASONS GIVEN BY SENTENCING COURTS FOR 
DOWNWARD DEPARTURE FROM THE GUIDELINE RANGE—FISCAL YEAR 2015 (2015), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-source-
books/2015/Table25.pdf (noting that family ties and responsibilities account for approximately nine 
percent of all departures). 
 136.  See supra text accompanying notes 112–113. 
 137.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 cmt. historical note (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2016) (indicating that § 5H1.6 was last revised in 2004). 
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Accordingly, the author of this Article joins others138 in calling for (1) a for-
mal amendment of the Sentencing Guidelines to make clear to sentencing 
judges that they can and should consider family ties and responsibilities when 
determining a sentence, and (2) a corresponding change to Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 32 to make clear that the presentence investigation report 
provided to the sentencing judge should address a defendant’s family respon-
sibilities, if any.  Both recommendations are explained more fully in Part III. 
In the absence of such amendments, despite the holdings of Booker and 
its progeny, “federal sentencing procedures continue to ignore the interplay 
between a defendant’s family responsibilities and the impact of sentencing 
on a defendant’s family.”139  Therefore, the likelihood that problems of pa-
rental incarceration can be addressed through individual sentencing decisions 
is unlikely, and the promise of Booker is left unrealized in this area.  In any 
event, a federal sentencing judge can only control the length of a sentence, 
but not other aspects of incarceration such as location and certain conditions 
of visitation—both of which can exacerbate problems of parental incarcera-
tion.140  As the next Section will detail, if meaningful change regarding a 
child’s ability to visit his or her imprisoned parent is to happen, it is much 
more likely to come through policies guiding prisons than through sentencing 
decisions of judges. 
D.  The Bureau of Prison’s Role in Incarceration Placement 
While much scholarship has been devoted to the Booker decision and 
its progeny, the length of parental incarceration is just one factor that impacts 
children of incarcerated parents.  Children are also potentially harmed when 
parents are incarcerated too far away for visitation.141  Once a federal judge 
has determined the length of a defendant’s sentence of incarceration, his or 
her involvement in the fashioning of the sentence is largely completed and 
the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) takes over. 
Pursuant to title 18, Section 3621 of the United States Code, it is the 
BOP that designates where an inmate serves their sentence.142  The BOP’s 
                                                          
 138.  Andersen, supra note 70, at 1530–32 (“Like the 2010 revisions to the Guidelines that al-
lowed courts to consider characteristics such as age and mental health, revisions to section 5H1.6 
can simply indicate that family ties ‘may be relevant in determining whether a departure is war-
ranted.’” (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.1, 5H1.3 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2014))). 
 139.  Id. at 1503. 
 140.  See infra text accompanying notes 142–143. 
 141.  See supra Part B.1 (explaining the benefits of visitation). 
 142.  18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2012) provides: 
The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of the prisoner’s imprisonment.  The 
Bureau may designate any available penal or correctional facility that meets minimum 
standards of health and habitability established by the Bureau, whether maintained by the 
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statutory authority provides it with near absolute discretion to place inmates 
in correctional facilities, even if well outside the judicial district where they 
were sentenced (and therefore potentially far away from any dependent chil-
dren), provided that the facility meets “minimum standards of health and hab-
itability established by the Bureau.”143  Although Section 3621 directs the 
BOP to consider “any statement by the court that imposed the sentence . . . 
recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as appropriate,”144 the 
BOP is not required to follow a judge’s recommendation regarding place-
ment, even if that judge makes the recommendation to facilitate the mainte-
nance of an inmate’s ties to their children.145  As one court put it when deny-
ing an inmate’s request to be transferred to a newly-opened correctional 
facility closer to his family, Congress has “expressly given” the BOP, rather 
than district court judges, the power to assign where an inmate is impris-
oned.146  While the BOP is to consider a judge’s recommendation, “the BOP 
is free to reject the recommendation of the sentencing judge.”147 
The BOP operates 122 prisons throughout the United States, and con-
tracts with private corporations to operate 11 additional correctional facili-
ties.148  Because the prison network is so massive, and because many of the 
prisons are clustered in certain geographic regions and absent in others,149 the 
result is that many incarcerated parents are imprisoned hundreds of miles 
from their children.  According to a 2009 study, eighty-four percent of par-
ents in federal facilities were incarcerated more than 100 miles from their 
place of residence at arrest; only about five percent of parents in the federal 
system were within fifty miles of their place of residence at arrest.150  This 
                                                          
Federal Government or otherwise and whether within or without the judicial district in 
which the person was convicted, that the Bureau determines to be appropriate and suita-
ble . . . . 
Id.  
 143.  Id.  
 144.  § 3621(b)(4)(B). 
 145.  See, e.g., United States v. Jessop, No. 1:04–CR–159 (GLS), 2006 WL 1877143, at *1 
(N.D.N.Y. July 6, 2006) (noting that under Section 3621(b)(4) “BOP has the exclusive right to 
designate the place of confinement, but it has the discretion to consider judicial recommendations 
concerning such matters as proximity to family or program participation,” and “the court has no 
jurisdiction to supersede the BOP’s authority”). 
 146.  United States v. Leland, No. 1:03–cr–00033–JAW–01, 2012 WL 1207160, at *1 (D. Me. 
Apr. 11, 2012) (quoting § 3621(b)). 
 147.  Id. (citing United States v. Boutot, 480 F. Supp. 2d 413, 419–20 (D. Me. 2007)). 
 148.  Our Locations, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/locations/ (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2018). 
 149.  For example, there is no federal prison located in the large geographic swath made up of 
the contiguous states of Idaho, Montana, Wyoming and North Dakota.  See Our Locations, FED. 
BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/locations/map.jsp (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 150.  SARAH SCHIRMER ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND 
THEIR CHILDREN: TRENDS 1991–2007, at 8 (2009), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2016/01/Incarcerated-Parents-and-Their-Children-Trends-1991-2007.pdf. 
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problem is especially exacerbated for incarcerated mothers, as “[w]omen 
convicted of federal crimes are particularly likely to be incarcerated far away 
from their children, because of the relatively small number of federal prisons 
for women.”151  Even if a district court judge were sympathetic to a mother’s 
desire to serve her term near her children, it is the BOP who decides where 
inmates are placed, and there are very few federal options for incarcerated 
women. 
III.  SHOUTING IN THE WIND: RECOMMENDATIONS UNLIKELY TO COME TO 
FRUITION 
A.  Previous Scholarship Addressing Children of Incarcerated Parents 
Scholars have already offered several helpful frameworks for improving 
the way that the criminal justice system treats the children of incarcerated 
parents, and this Article appreciates and has benefited from these excellent 
starting places.  However, in light of changed political circumstances as well 
as the lessons of time, this Article also candidly acknowledges why these 
previous recommendations are unlikely to be successful. 
For example, Chesa Boudin has argued that children of incarcerated par-
ents have a constitutional right, grounded in their “First Amendment freedom 
of association and their due process liberty interests,” to maintain a relation-
ship with their incarcerated parent.152  Mr. Boudin, himself the son of incar-
cerated parents,153 who, as an infant, was the subject of a seminal case about 
his mother’s right to visitation with him,154 inverts traditional paradigms to 
make this argument.  The First Amendment argument he makes reframes the 
discussion to focus on the child’s right to freedom of association with their 
parent, rather than focusing on the incarcerated parent’s rights.155  This inver-
sion of the traditional framework allows advocates (in theory) to sidestep the 
daunting Supreme Court precedents that provide essentially no right to visit-
ation for inmates—precedents which culminate in a ruling that “freedom of 
association is among the rights least compatible with incarceration.”156  Mr. 
Boudin’s due-process-liberty-interest argument posits that the Supreme 
                                                          
 151.  Abramowicz, supra note 71, at 231 (citing Myrna S. Raeder, Gender-Related Issues in a 
Post-Booker Federal Guidelines World, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 691, 745–46 (2006)). 
 152.  Chesa Boudin, Children of Incarcerated Parents: The Child’s Constitutional Right to the 
Family Relationship, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 77, 79 (2011). 
 153.  Jodi Wilgoren, From a Radical Background, A Rhodes Scholar Emerges, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
9, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/09/us/from-a-radical-background-a-rhodes-scholar-
emerges.html. 
 154.  Boudin v. Thomas, 533 F. Supp. 786, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), appeal dismissed, 697 F.2d 
288 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 155.  Boudin, supra note 152, at 105–07. 
 156.  Id. at 105 (quoting Overton v. Bazetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003)). 
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Court has recognized a constitutional due process liberty interest in family 
integrity.157  “That right, at least as it pertains to children, should not stop at 
the prison gate.”158  His arguments are intriguing, but ultimately unlikely to 
be persuasive; he himself acknowledges that “[s]ome of the constitutional 
arguments put forward here have been rejected or ignored by the Supreme 
Court.”159 
Several scholars have argued that courts and policy makers should adopt 
a family law perspective when sentencing parents or when determining 
prison visitation policies.  Sarah Abramowicz, for example, has argued that 
family law, with its focus on the best interests of children, offers both a ra-
tionale for considering children’s interests at sentencing and also a method 
for incorporating those interests.160  Professor Abramowicz frames her argu-
ment around seizing upon the momentum of Booker and, given that sentenc-
ing law is in a time of flux, asserts that now is the time to “bring children’s 
experience out from the shadows of family law.”161  She argues that “in every 
case where a parent stands to be incarcerated, the court should articulate how 
incarceration of the parent is likely to affect his or her child, and balance the 
potential harm to the child against competing concerns.”162  Her arguments 
are compelling and add an important dimension to the debate, and she herself 
acknowledges that she is beginning a conversation rather than providing all 
of the answers.163  Further, she also acknowledges that many of the “least 
controversial” solutions are ones that are beyond the scope of the judiciary 
and need to be implemented by policy makers.164  Unfortunately, for the rea-
sons discussed above in Part II  (including a desire to avoid being overturned, 
judicial familiarity with the Guidelines, and a desire to avoid disparate sen-
tences), the judiciary does not appear to have “seized” the post-Booker op-
portunity to revolutionize sentencing with an eye toward the best interests of 
children of incarcerated parents. 
                                                          
 157.  Id. at 109–12. 
 158.  Id. at 111. 
 159.  Id. at 105. 
 160.  Abramowicz, supra note 71, at 229.  Professor Abramowicz makes similar arguments re-
garding the use of family law as a framework for addressing parental incarceration in an earlier 
article as well.  See Sarah Abramowicz, Rethinking Parental Incarceration, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 
793, 797 (2011). 
 161.  Abramowicz, supra note 71, at 229. 
 162.  Id. at 235–36. 
 163.  Id. at 236 (“The difficult question that follows is how courts should balance children’s 
interests against competing concerns when sentencing parents convicted of crimes.  This Article 
hopes only to begin that conversation, and to encourage the family law community to engage in it; 
it does not purport to definitively resolve the issue.”). 
 164.  Id. (“One of the least controversial approaches—albeit one that would need to be taken up 
by legislators and prison administrators, as judges have limited control in the matter—would be to 
address prison policies that harm the children of incarcerated parents.”). 
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Other scholars have made specific recommendations for rule or policy 
changes that need to occur at the federal level.  For example, Emily Andersen 
argues that the Guidelines themselves should be revised to indicate that, in 
some circumstances, “alternative sentences can and should be considered” 
for defendants with family responsibilities.165  The question of whether par-
ents should receive a lessened or alternative sentence because of their status 
as parents is, of course, a controversial one.  Some commentators have argued 
that to do so would be to violate principles of equal protection,166 and even 
incentivize certain groups of people (namely “irreplaceable caregivers”) to 
engage in criminal behavior.167  These are not merely the hypothetical 
thoughts of academics; some courts have even gone so far as to suggest that 
taking parental status into account in fashioning a custodial sentence might 
incentivize some defendants to actually become parents in order to seek more 
lenient sentencing.  The First Circuit has reasoned that “allow[ing] a depar-
ture downward for pregnancy could set a precedent that would have danger-
ous consequences in the future, sending an obvious message to all female 
defendants that pregnancy is ‘a way out.’”168  While this Article agrees that 
certain changes should be made to the Guidelines, as is outlined in more de-
tail below, it is important to consider the resistance such a proposal has al-
ready received from both scholars and judges, as well as the current political 
climate.169 
Andersen also argues that there should be a requirement that the presen-
tence investigation reports currently required pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 32 include a “family impact assessment,” which would 
“include information about a defendant’s family and the impact a potential 
sentence might have on the family.”170  While this is a laudable goal, it again 
                                                          
 165.  Andersen, supra note 70, at 1532. 
 166.  Dan Markel et al., Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1147, 1195 (2007) (“Family ties benefits not only impede the accurate and just administration of 
criminal penalties, but they can also threaten basic commitments to equality under law.”). 
 167.  Id. at 1199 (“[S]ome family ties benefits can have the unwanted effect of incentivizing 
more criminal activity—and more successful criminal activity to boot.  To the extent the law effec-
tively signals messages to the public by highlighting that family membership confers special bene-
fits, some family ties benefits would encourage family members to keep their criminal enterprises 
in the family.”).  For a response, see generally Boudin, supra note 152, at 112–14, arguing that “the 
idea that some discount in sentencing or access to a child-friendly visiting room would incentivize 
crime should be absurd on its face.” 
 168.  United States v. Pozzy, 902 F.2d 133, 139 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting Presentence Investiga-
tion Report, id. (No. 89-1879)). 
 169.  See, e.g., Laura Litvan & Billy House, GOP Frets over Slow Pace of Congress Early in 
Trump Term, BLOOMBERG POLITICS (Feb. 16, 2017, 4:15 PM), https://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/articles/2017-02-16/republicans-fret-over-slow-pace-of-congress-early-in-trump-
term (noting that “Congress is off to a slow start” and that “[t]he Senate is tied up with delays in 
confirming President Donald Trump’s cabinet, the House is spending most of its time undoing reg-
ulations from the end of the previous president’s term”). 
 170.  Andersen, supra note 70, at 1533–34. 
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must be noted that amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is 
a complicated and time consuming process that involves Congress, the Su-
preme Court, advisory committees, and public notice and comment.171  Ac-
cordingly, reliance on rule change as a method of addressing the challenges 
faced by incarcerated parents and their children may be misplaced.  There-
fore, this Article instead brings a new suggestion to the table, and encourages 
federal sentencing judges to make use of a somewhat obscure provision of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to accomplish the same goal. 
B.  Previous Recommendations Unlikely to Gain Political Traction 
Several of the articles discussed above were written under the Obama 
Administration, and there was much excitement when President Obama took 
office that there would be significant criminal justice reform.172  “More than 
any administration in recent history, the Obama White House . . . focused on 
a law enforcement mission that might seem antithetical to hard-nosed prose-
cutors: getting criminal offenders out of jail early and trying to give them the 
skills to stay out.”173  The Obama Administration did include the children of 
incarcerated parents in the policy reforms it began on the problem of mass 
incarceration.  In 2013, the White House hosted a “Champions of Change” 
event to honor those who work to address the unique obstacles faced by chil-
dren of incarcerated parents.174  In 2014, the Department of Justice and the 
                                                          
 171.  CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 4 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1001 n.16 
(2015).  This process itself is a rather involved one: 
  The current rulemaking process under the Rules Enabling Act places primary respon-
sibility for rule development in judicial committees, though all amendments ultimately 
are subject to approval by Congress before taking effect.  First, the Advisory Committee 
on Civil Rules (composed of judges, professors, and lawyers) proposes and approves an 
amendment to the rules.  Next, the proposed revision may be preliminarily reviewed by 
the Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure.  Third, the amendment is circulated 
for consideration and comment by the public, and then is returned to the Advisory Com-
mittee, which may make further changes.  This final draft must again be approved by 
both the Advisory Committee and the Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure, 
and is next passed to the United States Judicial Conference.  After being accepted by the 
Judicial Conference, a proposed amendment is submitted to the Supreme Court.  Finally, 
after promulgation by the Supreme Court, the new rule becomes effective the following 
December 1 unless Congress takes action to alter or reject it. 
Id. 
 172.  Of course, policies aimed specifically at children of incarcerated parents are not the only 
way for an administration to address the problems faced by children of incarcerated parents: wide 
scale criminal justice reform, including addressing racial disparities in prosecutions and the school 
to prison pipeline, would no doubt make a real difference for these children.  Such broader initiatives 
are ultimately outside the scope of this Article, however. 
 173.  Eric Lichtblau, Obama Legacy of Freeing Prisoners May Come Under Trump Siege, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/15/us/politics/obama-prisoners.html. 
 174.  Cecilia Muñoz, Supporting Children of Incarcerated Parents, WHITE HOUSE: BLOG (JUNE 
19, 2013, 9:46 AM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2013/06/19/supporting-children-
incarcerated-parents. 
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Department of Health and Human Services joined others at the White House 
in announcing programming aimed at helping children of incarcerated par-
ents to succeed.175  On June 24, 2016, President Obama announced a series 
of measures to help support reentry for those leaving prison, including “the 
development of model family strengthening policies that can be adopted by 
and implemented in prisons and jails” such as “visiting policies and proce-
dures; visiting room and waiting room environments; parenting and other 
programming offered in correctional facilities; [and] family reunification and 
reentry planning.”176 
As of the time of this Article’s drafting, the year-old Trump Administra-
tion has not yet spoken on any of these issues.  It should.  But most political 
observers agree that significant progress on these issues is increasingly un-
likely under the Trump Administration, as President Trump came to power 
on a “law and order” platform and, at his confirmation hearings, Attorney 
General Sessions vowed that “cracking down on drugs, violence, gun crimes 
and illegal immigrants would be among his top priorities.”177  There is good 
reason to believe he will follow through on those priorities, as they mirror the 
goals that he espoused during his many years as a federal prosecutor and sen-
ator.178  These priorities, combined with Republican control of Congress, 
contribute to the conclusion below that most legislative change in favor of 
children of incarcerated parents is unlikely at this time. 
1.  Revision of the Sentencing Guidelines 
As noted above, other scholars have called for a revision of the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines,179 and the Sentencing Commission does indeed possess the 
statutory authority to propose Guidelines amendments to Congress.180  There 
                                                          
 175.  Austin & Mason, supra note 3. 
 176.  The White House Office of the Press Sec’y, FACT SHEET: President Obama Announces 
New Actions to Reduce Recidivism and Promote Reintegration of Formerly Incarcerated Individu-
als, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES (June 24, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2016/06/24/fact-sheet-president-obama-announces-new-actions-reduce-recidivism-
and. 
 177.  Lichtblau, supra note 173. 
 178.  Id.  
 179.  See, e.g., Andersen, supra note 70, at 1532. 
 180.  28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2012).  This subsection provides in relevant part that the Sentencing 
Commission: 
may promulgate under subsection (a) of this section and submit to Congress amendments 
to the guidelines and modifications to previously submitted amendments that have not 
taken effect, including modifications to the effective dates of such amendments.  Such an 
amendment or modification shall be accompanied by a statement of the reasons therefor 
and shall take effect on a date specified by the Commission, . . . except to the extent 
that . . . amendment is otherwise modified or disapproved by Act of Congress. 
Id.  
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are several forms this revision could take.  First, there could be a simple ex-
cision of Section 5H1.6 and its language providing that family responsibili-
ties should not ordinarily be relevant in the sentencing process.  Second, there 
could be an explicit alteration of the language, perhaps one that allowed for 
a more nuanced approach and provided specific language regarding depend-
ent minor children.  Unfortunately, for the reasons that will be discussed be-
low, these changes are unlikely in the foreseeable future. 
Despite their being unlikely, there is historical precedent for such 
amendments.  In 2010, the Sentencing Commission amended Guidelines Sec-
tion 5H1.11.181  That provision, which mirrored Section 5H1.6 in important 
ways, had discouraged consideration of “[m]ilitary, civic, charitable, or pub-
lic service,” during the sentencing phase, using the same language as Section 
5H1.6 that they were “not ordinarily relevant.”182  The amended language 
drafted by the Commission provides that prior “[m]ilitary service may be rel-
evant in determining whether a departure is warranted, if the military service, 
individually or in combination with other offender characteristics, is present 
to an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the typical cases covered 
by the guidelines.”183  In making this change, the Commission remarked that 
“applying this departure standard to consideration of military service is ap-
propriate because such service has been recognized as a traditional mitigating 
factor at sentencing.”184  The Commission then cited to a Supreme Court 
opinion in support of this statement.185  As noted above, multiple federal ap-
pellate courts have recognized the appropriateness of family responsibilities, 
including to minor children, as a proper mitigating factor at sentencing.186  
Therefore, there is both judicial and historical precedent for an amendment 
favoring recognition of family responsibility on the part of the Sentencing 
Commission. 
                                                          
 181.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11 historical note (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2010). 
 182.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5HI.11 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2009). 
 183.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5HI.11 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2010); see 
also Hessick, supra note 97 at 1363 (suggesting the consideration of military service is limited to 
prior service). 
 184.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL III app. C, amend. 739 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2011), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-man-
ual/2016/APPENDIX_C_Vol_III.pdf (citing Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 43 (2009)). 
 185.  Id. (“Our Nation has a long tradition of according leniency to veterans in recognition of 
their service, especially for those who fought on the front lines . . . .” (citing Porter, 558 U.S. at 
43)). 
 186.  See, e.g., United States v. Menyweather, 447 F.3d 625, 634 (9th Cir. 2006) overruled on 
other grounds by Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (holding that a single parent 
caring for a child, when balanced against other factors, is a proper mitigating factor); United States 
v. Prosperi, 686 F.3d 32, 48 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that caring for a spouse battling cancer is a 
proper mitigating factor). 
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However, there are several reasons to believe that such an amendment 
is unlikely to occur.  First, the majority of amendments made by the Sentenc-
ing Commission since the inception of the Sentencing Guidelines have been 
to increase sentence length rather than decrease sentence length by allowing 
for more mitigating circumstances.187  The Commission has proposed hun-
dreds of amendments, and “all but a handful” have proposed increases.188  
One reason for this may be that the eight member Sentencing Commission 
has historically been disproportionately staffed with prosecutors.189  There is, 
for example, a legislative mandate that the Attorney General or his designee 
sit as ex officio members,190 but no such mandate requires that defense coun-
sel be represented.191  The Sentencing Commission’s membership bias has 
caused its recommendations to be called into question: “Because the DOJ has 
such influence on the Commission, one is left to wonder whether the Com-
mission’s recommendations about sentencing are entirely neutral.”192 
Second, these amendments may be unlikely because the Sentencing 
Commission may not believe it has the power to amend Section 5H1.6 due 
to 28 U.S.C. § 994(e), which is the underlying legislation providing that 
“family ties and responsibilities” are “general[ly] inappropriate”193 to con-
sider when fashioning a sentence.  Of course, the Sentencing Commission 
could ask Congress to amend that provision.194  It is certainly within the Com-
mission’s power to make such legislative requests of Congress, and there is 
                                                          
 187.  See Hessick, supra note 97, at 1374 (stating “the guideline amendment process has gener-
ally operated as a one-way ratchet to increase sentences”). 
 188.  Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 766–67 (2005). 
 189.  See id. at 762–64 (explaining how the Commission member selection process “heavily 
tilt[s] toward law enforcement” and noting “[o]f the twenty-three people who ha[d] served as com-
missioners [by 2005], thirteen were former prosecutors—and that does not include the ex officio 
members appointed by the Attorney General.  Moreover, for much of the Commission’s existence, 
there have been enough former prosecutors on the Commission to form a majority, or close to it, at 
any one time.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 190.  28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2012) (providing that “[t]he Attorney General, or the Attorney Gen-
eral’s designee, shall be an ex officio, nonvoting member of the Commission”). 
 191.  Hessick, supra note 97, at 1375. 
 192.  Id. at 1376. 
 193.  See 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (2012) (“The Commission shall assure that the guidelines and pol-
icy statements, in recommending a term of imprisonment or length of a term of imprisonment, re-
flect the general inappropriateness of considering the education, vocational skills, employment rec-
ord, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties of the defendant.”).  Because the provision 
does not address military service, this would not have been an issue when the Commission amended 
§ 5H1.11 in 2010, as discussed above. 
 194.  See Hessick, supra note 97, at 1374 (“This is a highly controversial guideline policy.  Not 
only do a majority of federal judges disagree with the exclusion of family ties as a sentencing con-
sideration, but there are significant negative external consequences associated with incarcerating 
parents.  In particular, there appear to be a host of negative effects on children related to the sepa-
ration caused by a parent’s incarceration.” (footnotes omitted) (first citing Julian Abele Cook, Jr., 
Gender and Sentencing: Family Responsibility and Dependent Relationship Factors, 8 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 145, 145 (1995); then citing Joseph W. Luby, Reining in the “Junior Varsity Congress”: A 
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again historical precedent for it.  For example, as a recent Second Circuit 
opinion noted, since the Booker decision, the Sentencing Commission has 
made repeated requests to Congress to require both district court and appel-
late judges to give more weight to the Guidelines.195 
Accordingly, the Commission can and does make legislative recom-
mendations to Congress, and amending 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) would be an ap-
propriate one.  But this path—the Sentencing Commission seeking amend-
ment of a legislative provision from Congress, Congress following through, 
the Commission recommending the appropriate amendment to the Guide-
lines as a result, and Congress approving the amendment—is extraordinarily 
unlikely in the foreseeable future. 
2.  Applying Pepper v. United States to Section 5H1.6 
In light of the Sentencing Commission and/or Congress being unwilling 
or unable to amend Section 5H1.6 of the Guidelines or the relevant underly-
ing legislation which disfavors consideration of family responsibilities at sen-
tencing, it is worth exploring the likelihood that another branch—the judicial 
one—might take on this issue.  Individual judges arguably already have the 
power to do more to take children into consideration at sentencing.  But the 
odds that the Supreme Court itself will mandate or even bless such an ap-
proach is unlikely. 
In theory, the Supreme Court could unilaterally direct sentencing judges 
to ignore Section 5H1.6 when fashioning their sentences.  This outcome is 
                                                          
Call for Meaningful Judicial Review of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1199, 
1219–20 (1999); then citing Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered 
Women, and Other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 905, 936–37, 939–40, 943 (1993); then citing Patricia M. Wald, “What 
About the Kids?”: Parenting Issues in Sentencing, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 137, 137 (1995); then citing 
Ilene H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, The Role of Gender in a Structured Sentencing System: Equal 
Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing of Female Offenders Under the United States Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 181, 201 (1994); and then citing U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULT OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES JANUARY 2010 
THROUGH MARCH 2010, tbl. 13 (2010))).  
 195.  United States v. Pruitt, 813 F.3d 90, 94 n.8 (2d Cir. 2016).  In the Pruitt decision, the 
Second Circuit affirmed the underlying top of the Guidelines range sentence of the appellant, but 
wrote to urge the Sentencing Commission and the Judicial Conference to amend the Statement of 
Reasons form included within the statutorily-required form for the entry of criminal judgments.  Id. 
at 91.  Writing for the Court, Judge Gleeson, a District Court judge sitting by designation, noted: 
a check-a-box section of the form, which was checked by the district court in this case, 
invites sentencing judges to impose a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range 
simply because the judge finds no reason to depart.  Because that both undermines the 
statutory obligation to state the reasons for every sentence and unlawfully presumes the 
reasonableness of the advisory Guidelines range, the form should be amended.   
Id.  The case is thus also an example of the two-way relationship between the Sentencing Commis-
sion and federal judges, as the latter at times make recommendations to the former within written 
opinions. 
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perhaps the most unlikely, especially given the more conservative make-up 
of today’s Court with the addition of new Justice Neil Gorsuch, who in his 
first few months on the bench has “asserted his exceptionally conservative 
views early and often across a dizzying range of hot-button issues.”196  De-
spite the unlikeliness of it occurring, it is worthwhile to briefly outline how 
an advocate might attempt to rely on the Pepper decision in an attempt to at 
least argue to the Supreme Court that it direct lower courts to disregard Sec-
tion 5H1.6. 
As discussed above, in its Pepper decision, the Court affirmed a district 
court’s downward departure based on post-sentencing rehabilitation, despite 
the existence of a federal statute and a Commission policy statement disfa-
voring consideration of such evidence at sentencing.197  As it did in the Pep-
per decision, the Court could hold that sentencing judges are free to disregard 
Section 5H1.6 of the Guidelines, since the Court’s “post-Booker decisions 
make clear that a district court may in appropriate cases impose a non-Guide-
lines sentence based on a disagreement with the Commission’s views.  That 
is particularly true where, as here, the Commission’s views rest on wholly 
unconvincing policy rationales not reflected in the sentencing statutes Con-
gress enacted.”198 
Just as the Court in Pepper carefully dissected the proffered rationales 
behind the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement by attacking the com-
mentary provided for the relevant section,199 so too could the Court do this 
for Section 5H1.6.  The commentary on that section provides in part that “the 
fact that the defendant’s family might incur some degree of financial hardship 
or suffer to some extent from the absence of a parent through incarceration is 
not in itself sufficient as a basis for departure because such hardship or suf-
fering is of a sort ordinarily incident to incarceration.”200  The Court could 
instead focus on the facts that defendant’s families frequently face more than 
“some degree of financial hardship” and that children suffer more than “to 
                                                          
 196.  Ariane de Vogue, Justice Neil Gorsuch Delivering as Trump’s Promised Conservative, 
CNN (June 27, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/26/politics/justice-neil-gorsuch-president-
trump-gets-his-man/index.html (quoting interview with Joshua Matz, former clerk to Justice An-
thony Kennedy). 
 197.  See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text. 
 198.  Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 501 (2011) (citation omitted) (citing Kimbrough v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109–10 (2007)). 
 199.  Id. at 501–04.  The Commission had provided commentary stating “that departures based 
on postsentencing rehabilitation would ‘(1) be inconsistent with the policies established by Congress 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) [governing good time credit] and other statutory provisions for reducing 
the time to be served by an imprisoned person; and (2) inequitably benefit only those who gain the 
opportunity to be resentenced de novo.’”  Id. at 501 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 5K2.19 cmt. (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2010)).  The Court rejected both of those 
rationales.  Id. at 501–04. 
 200.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 cmt. (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
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some extent” when a parent is incarcerated.  The Court could thus conclude, 
as it did in Pepper, that “a district court may in appropriate cases impose a 
non-Guidelines sentence based on a disagreement with the Commission’s 
views”201 as laid out in Section 5H1.6, since the Commission’s views there 
“rest on wholly unconvincing policy rationales not reflected in the sentencing 
statutes Congress enacted.”202  Again, though, it seems unlikely that the Su-
preme Court would reach such a holding, especially with the addition of Jus-
tice Gorsuch. 
3.  Requirement of a Family Impact Statement 
Scholars have called for an amendment of Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 32 to include a “family impact assessment,” which would “include 
information about a defendant’s family and the impact a potential sentence 
might have on the family.”203  Such an amendment is procedurally cumber-
some204 and politically unlikely.205  Although there is precedent for Congress 
to demand the inclusion of impact statements in presentence investigation 
reports,206 and while this Article will briefly explore what such an amendment 
would look like in practice, once again this particular strategy is unlikely to 
come to fruition, at least through a formal amendment of the Rules.  Even 
though it is unlikely that there will be a wholesale shift here, there is still a 
way for individual judges to mandate the inclusion of such statements in their 
own courtrooms. 
In 2009, the San Francisco Adult Probation Department began to incor-
porate Family Impact Statements into the presentence investigation reports 
they prepared before each defendant’s sentencing.207  The goal of the Family 
                                                          
 201.  Pepper, 562 U.S. at 501. 
 202.  Id.  
 203.  Andersen, supra note 70, at 1533–34; see also Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, The Time Is Ripe 
to Include Considerations of the Effects on Families and Communities of Excessively Long Sen-
tences, 83 UMKC L. REV. 73, 114 (2014) (“[S]ection 3552 of title 18 of the United States Code, 
governing presentence investigation reports, should be amended at paragraph (B) to require that a 
part of the presentence report would include a new ‘Family Impact Statement.’”). 
 204.  See supra note 171 
 205.  See supra note 169. 
 206.  For example, in 1982, Congress passed the Victim and Witness Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512–15, 3579–80 (2012)), 
which mandated inclusion of victim impact statements in noncapital sentencing reports for federal 
crimes.  Specifically, that law requires presentence investigation reports to include “(C) information 
concerning any harm, including financial, social, psychological, and physical harm, done to or loss 
suffered by any victim of the offense; and (D) any other information that may aid the court in sen-
tencing, including the restitution needs of any victim of the offense.”  Victim and Witness Protection 
Act § 3. 
 207.  Wendy S. Still, San Francisco Realignment: Raising the Bar for Criminal Justice in Cali-
fornia, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 246, 247–48 (2013). 
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Impact Statements is to insure that sentencing judges have access to infor-
mation about how a sentence of incarceration might impact the defendant’s 
children and how best to protect family ties.208  These statements were mod-
eled after “environmental impact statements,”209 which are prepared by fed-
eral agencies before they undertake any action that could significantly affect 
the environment.210  The Family Impact Statements “focus on the sentenced 
person’s family details, such as the number of children, the children’s living 
situation, the person’s relationship to the caregiver, status as a primary care-
giver, and the county where the children reside.”211 
The use of Family Impact Statements is still relatively low, and only a 
handful of states are currently implementing them.212  But states that have 
adopted the practice, even on a trial basis, have reported encouraging results.  
In New York State, for example, the criminal justice advocacy group, The 
Osborne Association, worked with state probation professionals to urge pro-
bation officers to incorporate Family Impact Statements into their pre-sen-
tencing investigation reports.213  The Osborne Association worked alongside 
probation officers in a collaborative manner, rather than attempting to create 
change through legislative channels.214  The initiative encountered some re-
sistance, including resistance from those who “were concerned that [Family 
Impact Statements] would prioritize the defendant’s family circumstances 
over the victim’s family circumstances, thereby eclipsing the statutorily re-
quired Victim Impact Statement.”215  By working collaboratively with pro-
bation officers, the Osborne Association was able to overcome this initial 
                                                          
 208.  Id.  
 209.  Margaret diZerega, San Francisco’s Family-Focused Probation: A Conversation with 
Chief Adult Probation Officer Wendy Still, 24 FED. SENT’G. REP. 54, 54 (2011). 
 210.  Peter Olasky, Crime Impact Statements, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 329, 349–50 
(2004).  Environmental impact statements are required at the federal level by the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969, which “requires that before a federal agency undertakes an ‘action’ that 
could significantly affect the environment, the agency must prepare and publicize a detailed state-
ment outlining the environmental impact of the proposed action as well as alternatives.” Id. (citing 
40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.12–.16 (2003)). 
 211.  diZerega, supra note 209, at 54 (citing CAROL LIU, FACT SHEET: SENATOR LIU, FAMILY 
IMPACT STATEMENT (2010)).  
 212.  See THE OSBORNE ASS’N, FAMILY IMPACT STATEMENTS: CONSIDERING THE NEEDS OF 
CHILDREN 2 (2012) (noting that as of 2012, only courts in San Francisco, Arkansas, and Tennessee 
used Family Impact Statements). 
 213.  Allison Hollihan, Garnering Support for Policy Change: Family Impact Statement, 
JUSTICE STRATEGIES (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.justicestrategies.org/coip/blog/2015/02/garner-
ing-support-policy-change-family-impact-statement. 
 214.  Id. (“While state legislation or regulatory reform would be required to add a stand-alone 
[Family Impact Statement] section to pre-sentencing investigation reports, it is not needed to include 
such information into the existing report format.”). 
 215.  Id.  Indeed, the group ultimately chose to rename the statements to “Family Responsibility 
Statements.”  Id.   
 420 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:385 
 
resistance, and Family Impact Statements are now highlighted as a “best 
practice” in Office of Probation and Correctional Alternatives training for all 
new probation officers in New York.216 
In order to make Family Impact Statements mandatory for inclusion in 
federal presentence investigation reports, an amendment to Rule 32 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (which requires the reports) would be 
required.  Specifically, there would need to be an amendment to Rule 32(d), 
which currently requires that the presentence investigation report include 
“the defendant’s history and characteristics,” “information that assesses any 
financial, social, psychological, and medical impact on any victim,” and 
“when appropriate, the nature and extent of nonprison programs and re-
sources available to the defendant.”217  The amendment could track the lan-
guage already provided about impact on victims and, thus, could require that 
the presentence investigation report contain “information that assesses any 
financial, social, psychological, and medical impact on the defendant’s fam-
ily, especially any minor children.” 
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS THAT ARE MORE LIKELY TO SUCCEED 
The preceding Part is rather depressing, as it concludes time and time 
again that certain avenues for addressing the issues experienced by children 
of incarcerated parents are likely foreclosed, and will remain foreclosed for 
some time in the future.  But not all is lost.  First, there is an alternative way 
that individual district court judges could mandate the use of Family Impact 
Statements in their courtrooms, even absent a formal amendment of Rule 32, 
and this Article makes the unique case for it here.  Second, there are certain 
modest but impactful policy shifts that individual states or even prisons could 
adopt that would support meaningful visitation between incarcerated parents 
and their children, and this visitation is a powerful protection against many 
of the harms associated with parental incarceration. 
                                                          
By emphasizing the defendant’s parenting responsibilities, rather than the impact on their 
children, we garnered buy-in from those who expressed concern about eclipsing the vic-
tim impact statement or who were not overly-empathetic about potential impacts on chil-
dren (e.g., ‘the parent should have thought of the children before committing the crime’).  
Furthermore, by simply changing the name to Family Responsibility Statement, people 
were less likely to conflate Victim Impact Statements and Family Impact Statements. 
Id.  
 216.  Id.  
 217.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(A)–(C). 
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A.  Using Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 32(d)(2)(G) to 
Require the Inclusion of Family Impact Statements in Presentence 
Investigation Reports 
Currently, Rule 32(d)(2)(G) requires that the presentence investigation 
report include “any other information that the court requires, including infor-
mation relevant to the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”218  This language 
was included as part of the 2007 Rule 32 amendments that were undertaken 
in the wake of the Booker decision.219  According to the commentary included 
with that amendment, the language in subsection (d)(2)(G) “contemplates 
that a request can be made either by the court as a whole requiring infor-
mation affecting all cases or a class of cases, or by an individual judge in a 
particular case.”220 
Research did not yield a single example of a judge using this subsection 
to require anything resembling a family impact statement.  Rather, the few 
citations to this subsection of the Rule have pertained to matters other than 
family ties, such as to support the inclusion of an unproven allegation that the 
defendant sexually abused a child,221 or to justify a refusal of a district court 
judge to recuse herself from a case at sentencing.222  But in one remarkable, 
recent opinion out of the Eastern District of New York, Senior District Court 
Judge Frederic Block relied on Rule 32(d)(2)(G) to require the probation de-
partment to include a summary of all federal collateral consequences faced 
by the defendant, and noted that “[t]he Probation Department should include 
a collateral-consequences section in all future pre-sentence reports.”223  Be-
cause this groundbreaking opinion could provide a roadmap for judges to 
similarly mandate the inclusion of Family Impact Statements, it is worth ex-
ploring more fully here. 
In United States v. Nesbeth,224 the defendant had been found guilty, after 
a jury trial, of importation of cocaine with intent to distribute, resulting in an 
                                                          
 218.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(G).  The Section 3553(a) factors include the kinds of sentences 
available, any pertinent policy statements, and the history and characteristics of the defendant.  18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). 
 219.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 32, 2007 amend. cmt. 
 220.  Id.  Note that as of the time of those amendments, the language was found in subsection 
(d)(2)(F), not (d)(2)(G).  Id.  In the 2011 amendments, the language was renumbered subdivision 
(d)(2)(G) for “stylistic purposes.”  FED. R. CRIM. P. 32, 2011 amend. cmt. 
 221.  United States v. Bartlett, 416 F. App’x 508, 510–11 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 222.  United States v. Mitchell, No. 13–cr–00538, 2014 WL 3735266, at *1 (D.N.J. July 29, 
2014) (denying defendant’s motion for recusal in response to sentencing judge’s request to probe 
for more information on defendant’s finances).  In Mitchell, the sentencing judge noted that Rule 
32(d)(2)(G) recognizes the judge’s right and obligation to “seek[] additional information pursuant 
to its duty to consider all relevant information and to ensure the accuracy of the PSR [presentence 
investigation report] prior to fashioning a sentence.”  Id. at *5. 
 223.  United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 197 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 224.  188 F. Supp. 3d 179. 
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advisory guidelines range of thirty-three to forty-one months of incarcera-
tion.225  Judge Block departed and issued a non-incarceratory sentence of one 
year of probation, “in part because of a number of statutory and regulatory 
collateral consequences [the defendant would] face as a convicted felon.”226  
Recognizing the significance of such a decision, Judge Block wrote a lengthy 
opinion that is part scholarly article and part sentencing memorandum.  He 
began by tracing the history of collateral consequences in this country, in-
cluding post-conviction statutory and regulatory collateral consequences.227  
He then turned to the governing case law and arrived at his sentence, factor-
ing in the collateral consequences the defendant would face and balancing of 
all Section 3553(a) factors.228  Finally, he included a section on the responsi-
bilities of counsel and the Probation Department with respect to collateral 
consequences.229 
The opinion is sweeping in its reach and rather astonishing in its scope, 
and it garnered a fair amount of media attention.230  Although the defendant 
in Nesbeth did not have children, and so Judge Block did not have occasion 
to speak on the impact of parental incarceration as a form of “collateral con-
sequence,” he did note in dicta that incarceration can cause parents to lose 
custody of their children, amongst other harms, and that, “[i]n this way, the 
statutory and regulatory scheme contributes heavily to many ex-convicts be-
coming recidivists and restarting the criminal cycle.”231  Judge Block ended 
his opinion by declaring, in part because of Rule 32(d)(2)(G), that “it is the 
obligation of both the defense lawyer and the prosecutor, as well as the Pro-
bation Department in the preparation of its [presentence investigation report], 
to assess and apprise the court, prior to sentencing, of the likely collateral 
consequences facing a convicted defendant.”232 
                                                          
 225.  Id. at 180. 
 226.  Id.  
 227.  Id. at 180–86. 
 228.  Id. at 186–96. 
 229.  Id. at 196–98. 
 230.  See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Judge’s Striking Move in Felony Drug Case: Probation, 
Not Prison, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/nyregion/in-a-strik-
ing-move-brooklyn-judge-orders-probation-over-prison-in-felony-drug-case.html (noting that the 
Nesbeth opinion has been called “groundbreaking”); Lincoln Caplan, Why a Brooklyn Judge Re-
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The Government did not appeal the Nesbeth decision, and thus, neither 
the Second Circuit nor the Supreme Court have weighed in on the ideas (and 
ideals) Judge Block outlined there.  However, despite the opinion being only 
eighteen months old, it has already been cited to dozens of times by other 
judges, defense attorneys, and scholars.233  Mandating a Family Impact State-
ment that required the probation department to include information about 
how an incarceratory sentence would impact a defendant’s children is just as 
squarely within a judge’s power under Rule 32(d)(2)(G) as a statement on 
collateral consequences.  Federal district court judges who are concerned 
about this issue and do not want to wait for action from Congress, the Su-
preme Court, or the Sentencing Commission, have a tool already at their dis-
posal for mandating the inclusion of Family Impact Statements. 
B.  Improving Prison Visitation Policies 
As discussed above, frequent and high-quality visitation has been shown 
to benefit both children and incarcerated parents, as well as society at large 
through lowered recidivism rates.  Visitation policies, however, frequently 
deter families from visiting.  Restrictive visitation policies that deter children 
from visiting “flow from cultural and institutional beliefs that incarcerated 
individuals, including parents, do not deserve privileges such as family visit-
ation.”234  Indeed, some states have visitation policies that single out children.  
For example, New Hampshire prohibits all toys in the visiting room and 
warns that “visits will be terminated if children are allowed to misbehave or 
become out of control.”235 
Prison visitation policies can be dizzying in their scope and uneven in 
their application.  At a recent listening session hosted by the Federal Inter-
agency Reentry Council’s Subgroup on Children of Incarcerated Parents, a 
young woman recounted her story of being turned away at the door of her 
father’s prison after having traveled for a long distance because she had vio-
lated the prison’s dress code.236  Her violation?  She was wearing blue, which 
was associated as a gang color.237  Visitor dress codes can be mind-bog-
glingly specific; in the state of Tennessee, for example, visitors must wear 
undergarments but must not wear “inappropriate” undergarments such as 
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“thongs and water brassieres.”238  They are also prohibited from wearing 
“spandex or spandex-type fabrics,”239 “worn or tattered clothing,”240 and 
“clothing with logos that contain pictures.”241  As any parent of a toddler can 
attest, children’s clothing frequently contains logos with pictures. 
Amending prison visitation policies so that they are more family 
friendly and more encouraging of visits from children is relatively low hang-
ing fruit for improving the experiences of children of incarcerated parents.  
The specific series of recommendations that follow are modest, cost little to 
implement, and have already been proven successful in certain states and dis-
tricts. 
1.  Policies Should Explicitly Promote Visits by Children 
Prison visitation policies should explicitly promote visits by minor chil-
dren in a welcoming fashion.  Washington State’s Department of Corrections 
is a leader in this area.  Its prison visitation policy clearly provides that “[t]he 
Department will provide visiting opportunities and programs and a secure 
and welcoming visit space for offenders and their families to provide as nor-
mal a family experience as possible.”242  Rather than viewing children as an 
afterthought, or being openly hostile to their presence by banning toys or di-
aper bags, the Washington policy provides that “[d]esignated visit areas 
should include a section that has a child-friendly environment with toys and 
games suitable for interaction by family members of all ages,”243 and that 
“[s]pace may be provided for the proper storage of visitors’ coats, handbags, 
and other personal items not allowed into the visiting area.”244  The policy 
recognizes that young, minor children should be treated differently than other 
visitors, and provides that “[i]n addition to brief, appropriate contact at the 
beginning of each visit, an offender may have physical contact with his/her 
child(ren) 8 years of age and under.”245  Physical contact with an incarcerated 
parent is especially important for very young children, and “the lack of con-
tact visitation in most local jails creates serious problems for newborns and 
infants who do, in fact, crave their parent’s touch.”246 
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The overall tone of the Washington policy as it relates to children is one 
of welcome, and this is reflected in the directive the policy provides to em-
ployees who oversee these visits, which reiterates “the importance of visiting 
to maintain ties with family and friends, and in some cases reunification of 
offenders with their families and significant others.”247  Prisons can and 
should have policies that promote safety while also promoting the mainte-
nance of family ties and visitation for children. 
2.  Visitation Hours Should Be Extended 
Prisons should review their visitation hours to be sure they are as con-
venient and open as possible.  Too often, visitation hours are scheduled only, 
or predominantly, during working hours, and this further deters children (who 
under policy must be accompanied by adults) from being able to visit their 
incarcerated parents.  States and cities that have addressed this issue have 
been able to make meaningful changes.  For example, the San Francisco Chil-
dren of Incarcerated Parents Partnership248 “worked with the[ir local] sher-
iff’s department to improve the visiting policies” in prisons there, and fo-
cused specifically on increasing visiting hours.249  As a result of that 
partnership, “opportunities for parent-child visits increased to 32.5 hours per 
week in 2011 from 11.5 hours per week in 2007.”250 
3.  Partnerships with Nonprofits Should Be Explored 
Prisons should work with local nonprofits to support opportunities for 
children to have free transportation to prisons on selected visitation days.  
Because parents are frequently incarcerated far from their minor children, the 
costs (both in terms of dollars and time) of attempting to visit are often quite 
high.251  Several nonprofits have stepped up to try to help families who wish 
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to visit but cannot afford the trip.  For example, each year, the Center for 
Restorative Justice Works hosts its “Get on the Bus” event, which provides 
free transportation for children to visit their parents who are incarcerated in 
California.252  The program attempts to make the child’s visit more comfort-
able and meaningful, providing the children with travel bags and meals, and 
also with post-event counseling on the ride home (along with a teddy bear 
and a letter from their incarcerated parent).253 
These programs not only alleviate the financial burden of visiting, they 
also normalize the experience in a way that reduces stigma, as all of the other 
children on the bus are going to visit an incarcerated parent as well.  The 
event also helps make the visits more family friendly.  For example, during 
a Get on the Bus trip to San Quentin for Father’s Day last year, the itinerary 
for the visit included face painting and temporary tattoos.254  The Center for 
Restorative Justice Works operates the program in conjunction with the Cal-
ifornia Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.255  All prison systems 
should be open to such partnerships, and indeed should actively seek them 
out. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
“Men are not prisoners of fate, but only prisoners of their own 
minds.”256 
Children of incarcerated parents have done nothing wrong.  They have 
broken no laws, they have violated no rules.  Still, they are punished.  They 
serve their parents’ sentences alongside them, innocent and often hidden vic-
tims.  It is beyond time for judges and policy makers to consider these chil-
dren when fashioning a sentence or setting policy such as prison visitation 
rules.  Although the current Republican-controlled Congress and the Trump 
Administration may not prioritize changes to the Sentencing Guidelines or 
                                                          
lockdown (eliminating all visits) or other interruption, the mother and child are not guar-
anteed to see their husband and father.  In sum, for the mere possibility of a short visit 
with their husband and father, the mother and child would likely have to spend several 
hundred dollars and commit at least two days. 
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the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that would benefit children of incar-
cerated parents, there are still changes that individual judges or prison policy 
officials can undertake now.  These children deserve our attention and the 
modest changes outlined here should be considered only the beginning of 
what we can do. 
